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Foreword
Certification of agricultural products is an increasingly common tool that 
is expected to contribute to agricultural improvement, farmer well-being, 
poverty alleviation, reduced environmental impact and food safety. In an 
increasingly competitive market, processors, manufacturers and retailers 
use certification to demonstrate their green and sustainable credentials 
and differentiate their products. In some commodity sectors, such as 
coffee and cocoa, products certified as sustainable are on track to reach 
majority market share in important producing and consuming nations. This 
development poses a major challenge for farmers in general, and small-scale 
farmers in ACP and other developing countries, in particular.
This publication, commissioned by CTA, presents the findings of a study of 
the impact of certification on farmers in coffee, cocoa, cotton, fruit and 
vegetables. Substantial investments have been made by the private sector 
and donors to promote the uptake of certification by small-scale farmers. 
Understanding the effects these programmes have on small-scale farmers is 
vital as certification continues to expand.
Certification agencies and the NGOs that help to implement their 
programmes, sometimes provide a rosy view of expected benefits. The picture 
that emerges from this study is that the benefits for small-scale farmers are less 
obvious than usually stated. Nevertheless, certification can be part of a viable 
strategy for companies, farmer groups and farmers. However, whether dealing 
with a donor-funded project or a commercial supply chain, the decision to 
invest in certification must rest on sound economic and market fundamentals.
This is the fifth publication in CTA’s new “Value Chains & Trade” series. We 
trust that it will give sufficient pointers for farmers, farmer groups, companies, 
governments, donors and NGOs to critically examine certification in order to 
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background
Certification of products and production processes dates back to the 
early 1900s. Up to the late 1980s, organic certification was the single most 
important agricultural certification scheme. The concept of fair trade had 
been around since the 1950s but in late 1988, the first Max Havelaar Fairtrade-
certified coffee appeared on the shelves in Dutch supermarkets. From 
coffee, Fairtrade expanded into other product categories such as fruit and 
vegetables, cotton, cocoa and flowers. Today it certifies 15 different single 
products and numerous composite ones. 
In the 1990s, growing concerns over food safety, workers’ rights, deforestation 
and farmers’ livelihoods led to a substantial number of new certification 
initiatives. The Rainforest Alliance certified its first farm (a large-scale banana 
plantation) in 1993. UTZ Certified started in 1998. GLOBALG.A.P.  (then called 
EUREPGAP) started at that time as an initiative of European retailers in the 
horticultural sector. Towards the end of the 1990s and during the next decade, 
the certification movement gained momentum, with companies using it as an 
insurance policy that demonstrated their commitment to responsible sourcing. 
 
The study
This publication reports on an analysis of 270 studies of certification and 
verification schemes in the cocoa, coffee, cotton and fruit and vegetable 
sectors for small-scale farmers. These were supplemented with information 
obtained through standard-setting bodies, organisations that implement 
certification initiatives, supply-chain actors, universities and consultants. Eight 
certification schemes were considered:
1. 4C
2. Better Cotton Initiative (BCI)
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5. GLOBALG.A.P. 
6. Organic
7. Rainforest Alliance (RA)
8. UTZ Certified (UTZ).
Particular emphasis is placed on 19 of the studies, which used a methodology 
that allows the impacts found to be attributed to the specific certification 
scheme. The coffee sector, for which certification has been used since the 
1980s, is covered by 15 such studies. For sectors where certification is a more 
recent phenomenon, the number is more limited. We can only draw firm 
conclusions on the impact of certification for the coffee sector. However, the 
numerous studies consulted allowed us to make some important general 
conclusions on the use of certification by small-scale farmers.
Evidence for a positive impact of coffee 
certi f ication is l imited
Certified coffee farmers, especially Fairtrade certified producers, have 
achieved price increases but they have failed to achieve productivity 
increases that would further leverage positive price effects, with one 
exception. The evidence on production costs is mixed, with 40% of the studies 
showing that costs for certified coffees are higher. Farming efficiency was not 
affected by certification. Despite price increases, effects on income were 
neutral, due to increased production and control costs. Certified producers 
have more access to services such as training.
Lack of data on certi f ication costs for small-scale 
farmers and certi f icate-holders 
Many certification programmes are co-funded by donors, leading to 
programme costs that are not always transparent and to a difficulty in 
assessing the benefits of certification if no donor support is available. 
Information on costs is often scattered throughout different organisations 
involved in supporting farmers to become certified. Further, companies that 
act as certificate-holders do not share information on implementation costs 
as this is regarded as competitive information. As a result, even the studies 
on costs and benefits of certification that have been published usually lack 
information on several cost items. Many studies base their calculations on 
assumptions about factors such as membership of producer organisations, 
volumes produced per farmer, or premiums received by farmers. This leads to 
unrealistic calculations on the net benefit of certification programmes.
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Certif ication costs can only be recovered by 
farmers producing above-average volumes
The factors which determine whether a farmer will invest in certification, apart 
from client demand, are: implementation costs, production volumes per 
farmer, premium levels and marketability rates, i.e. the percentage of certified 
produce that receives premiums. Implementation costs are a function of the 
number of farmers with whom a company or farmer organisation implements 
a certification programme, whereas benefits in the form of premiums are a 
function of the volume sold. Low-volume farmers are more costly to certify 
and frequently sell insufficient quantities to cover their certification costs. 
While it is frequently argued that sustainability certification assists small-
scale producers, more organised small-scale producers with relatively high 
production levels are more likely to reach or surpass break-even point on 
certification costs. Depending on the level of implementation costs, above-
average volumes per small-scale farmer must be produced for certification to 
be profitable. This is true for all commodities analysed in this study. 
Although company-led implementation of sustainability certification 
is becoming the predominant model, implementing certification cost-
effectively in countries with low production per farmer is likely to remain 
a challenge, even for well-funded companies. Donor funding (or so-
called public-private partnerships) is likely to remain important for field-
level implementation. If such funding is withdrawn, certificate-holders and 
farmers may be required to meet certification costs that can only be partly 
recovered through premiums.
Factors influencing certi f ication costs
There are several factors that influence the costs of certification. These 
include:
• the starting situation of farmers prior to certification
• organisational presence (e.g. farmer organisations, NGOs) and the 
availability of trainers
• the scale of a programme
• the number of farmers that are already organised in producer groups, and 
the organisational capacities of such groups
• access to donor funding, at least in the short-term.
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Factors influencing certi f ication benefits
The factors that influence the potential benefits include:
• the volume produced per farmer
• the standard technical assistance provided
• the security of markets and buyer commitment
• the availability of contracts between farmers and buyers and direct 
procurement
• organic farming, which may lead to income loss due to the conversion 
period
• farmer characteristics, such as capacities, assets and ability to export. 
Recommendations to improve the certi f ication 
business case and impact on smallholders
When considering whether to become certified, producers and potential 
certificate-holders should investigate the potential financial benefits, the 
expected costs, and the factors that would influence the business case 
for certification. Based on the information acquired from such research, a 
conclusion can be drawn on the expected net benefit of certification. 
The apparent lack of significant benefits to small-scale farmers from 
certification leads us make a number of recommendations.
1. Certification schemes must improve transparency about their costs and 
benefits. Based on more insights on net benefits, farmers and certificate-
holders would be in a better position to decide whether or not to opt 
for certification. In addition, donors could use the information to decide 
whether or not to invest in certification programmes. 
2. For prospective certificate-holders it would be beneficial to have access 
to high quality market data on the different certificates. Only 4C,i UTZ 
Certified and BCI provide reliable aggregate production and demand 
figures. All certification schemes should make available country-level 
supply and demand information to the general public and prospective 
certificate-holders and producers. 
3. Certification implementation costs could be reduced by loosening 
requirements for certificate-holders that have shown consistently good 
i 4C annual reports since recently also include coffee supply and demand data for Fairtrade 
and Rainforest Alliance.
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performance over a certain period. They could be rewarded with a lower 
frequency of audits, for example, or customised codes of conduct that 
only target those issues that are relevant to their situation. Harmonisation 
of certification standards and combined audits by different certifiers 
could significantly reduce certification costs.
4. Donors and others should compare the costs and benefits of certification 
programmes with the costs and benefits of other supply-chain 
interventions, such as different kinds of service-delivery programmes or 
contract-farming schemes. Certification is not the only way of improving 
small-scale farmer livelihoods and there is evidence that it benefits 
primarily the more affluent farmers as certified farmers are often better 
educated, have more assets and larger farms, are located closer to 
market outlets and are situated in favourable agro-ecological zones. 
It would be helpful if the impact of the different interventions could be 
compared, so enabling all concerned to assess the opportunity cost of 
certification interventions compared with other development activities.
Four scenarios for future developments around 
certi f ication
In some markets, such as coffee and cocoa, certified products are on track 
to become mainstream. The general expectation is that as certification 
becomes mainstream, premium payments will erode. At the same time, 
producing certified products may become essential for entry into certain 
markets. Based on experiences of the implementation of certification 
systems, we foresee the following possible developments of (sustainability) 
certification, examples of which can already be found:
1. Certificate-holders will cease to be certified because certification costs 
cannot be recovered. Because of the ambitious certification targets now 
being set by manufacturers, a widespread abandonment of certification 
is considered unlikely. However, farmers who have relied on significant 
donor support to meet certification costs may struggle to continue if that 
support is withdrawn, particularly if their marketability rates are low.
2. Producers or certificate-holders bear the costs of certification if 
certification becomes an essential requirement to export to certain 
markets, and premiums disappear. When something becomes a de 
facto standard there ceases to be a reason to pay a premium for it. The 
premium price becomes the new norm. The more likely alternative is that 
no price increase occurs, the premium disappears, and the certification 
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costs are borne by the certificate-holders, who may attempt to pass on 
compliance costs to farmers.
3. Alternative certification systems are created to decrease certification 
costs. Certification may become too expensive, leading certificate-
holders to consider setting up competing systems. The willingness of 
manufacturers and large retailers to accept such a move is not clear. 
4. Certification becomes the standard. To keep differentiating themselves 
from other standards and in response to demand from manufacturers 
and retailers, certification schemes add more and more requirements to 
what already exists. If certification becomes a precondition for export to 
developed markets, certification agencies will want to keep distinguishing 
themselves from their competitors. Several have recently added climate 
change requirements to their code or are developing them. Gender may 
follow in the near future.
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Certification of agricultural products is an increasingly common tool that 
is expected to contribute to agricultural improvement, farmer well-being, 
poverty alleviation, reduced environmental impact and food safety. 
Processors, manufacturers and retailers use certification to demonstrate 
their green and sustainable credentials. They are also known to use 
certification to distinguish their offerings from those of their competitors. 
Certified farmers adhere to a set of predefined principles and practices 
that are captured in a code of conduct. An outside organisation, usually a 
commercial company, NGO or stakeholder platform, owns and maintains 
the code of conduct and issues certificates to those farmers or farmer 
groups that were found to be in compliance during regularly recurring 
audits. Being certified is supposed to confer numerous benefits on farmers, 
ranging from better farming to environmental protection and access to 
markets and, sometimes, premium payments. Substantial investments have 
been made by the private sector and donors to promote the uptake of 
certification by small-scale farmers. In some commodity sectors, such as 
coffee and cocoa, products certified as sustainable are on track to reach 
majority market share in important producing and consuming nations. 
In such a situation, certified products are understood to have become 
mainstream. As certification becomes mainstream, premium payments 
will erode. At the same time, producing certified products may become a 
required entry licence for certain markets.
This development presents challenges to those small-scale farmers who are 
not yet certified, but who supply to markets where certification is growing 
in importance. It also presents challenges to public and private sector 
organisations that work with these producers. Similarly, already certified 
farmers and their value-chain partners will have to deal with the likelihood of 
eroding premiums combined with recurring implementation costs.
Given the importance of agricultural exports for many developing and 
emerging countries and a lack of coherent information on both the costs 
and benefits of certification for small-scale farmers in countries from the 
1 Introduction
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Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group of States (ACP), this study addresses the 
following research questions:
• What are the net results of certification and verification in the cocoa, 
coffee, cotton and fruit and vegetable sectors for small-scale farmers?
• What are the contextual factors that affect certified producers?
• What steps could be taken to maximize benefits and minimise costs of 
certification for small-scale farmers?
In Chapter 2 we explain the methodologies we used for this study, i.e. which 
certification systems we reviewed, how we selected the information, which 
indicators we assessed and how we calculated the costs of certification. 
In Chapter 3 we provide a historical background to certification systems. In 
Chapters 4 to 7 we analyse the different sectors: coffee (Chapter 4), cocoa 
(Chapter 5), cotton (Chapter 6), and fruit and vegetables (Chapter 7). In 
these chapters we describe the relevant market and sector, discuss the 
benefits for small-scale farmers, and provide a cost-benefit analysis. Chapter 
8 provides an overview of contextual factors influencing certification costs 
and benefits. Chapter 9 presents some conclusions. As information on 
concrete financial costs and benefits for small-scale producers is scarce 
in the literature, Chapter 10 outlines recommendations for producers and 
certificate-holders, aimed to assist their decision-making on whether or not to 
become certified. General recommendations for improving the business case 
for certification, and maximising benefits and minimising costs of certification 
for small-scale farmers, are presented. Chapter 11 presents four different 
scenarios for future certification development.
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2.1  Which certi f ication and verif ication systems are 
reviewed, and for which sectors?
A total of 148 certification and verification schemes related to food and 
agriculture were operational at the end of 2012.1 A number of organisations 
make a distinction between certification and verification, but that distinction 
is not consistently applied or commonly accepted. The ISEAL Alliance, 
a global membership organisation for sustainability standards, defines 
certification as ‘assuring compliance with a sustainability standard. Often 
this is done through a third-party audit, whereby an independent auditor or 
auditing team visits the operation to assess practices against the standard.2’ 
According to 4C, which calls itself a verification scheme, a third-party verifier 
will visit the group that wishes to become or remain 4C verified and checks its 
compliance against the 4C standard.3 
Given the ambiguous distinction between the two, we will use the term 
‘certification’ in this report to mean both certification and verification 
schemes.
The term small-scale farmers refers to small-scale family farms where farming 
is the mainstay of family income. The definition of small-scale varies from 
country to country and crop to crop, but typically ranges from less than 1 ha 
to around 10 ha. 
Eight certification schemes are considered in this study (Table 1).ii
ii Originally, 14 standards systems were to be investigated, but as we did not find (good quality) 
information on six of them (Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), Ethical Trade Initiative 
(ETI), Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP), IMO Fair for Life (IMOFFL), National 
standards/certification initiatives, Geographical indications), we have not included them in 
this report. 
2 Methodology
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2.2  How was information selected for the assessment? 
This study is primarily a literature study. Information obtained from the 
literature was supplemented with information obtained through standard-
setting bodies, organisations that implement certification initiatives, supply-
chain actors, universities and consultants, to provide concise answers to the 
research questions (see Appendix 1 for the list of organisations contacted).
 
In the assessment we used a grading system for papers, articles and reports 
in order to make an objective judgment on the likely quality, accuracy 
and reliability of the sources. This grading system distinguishes between the 
following five categories of information sources:4
1. Impact studies that use a credible counter-factual scenario (quantitative 
assessment, comparing similar certified and non-certified farmers by at 
least two points in time)
2. Impact studies that do not use a credible counter-factual scenario 
(quantitative assessments comparing certified and non-certified farmers, 
using data from one point in time, or comparing the evolution of certified 
farmers over time)
3. Other impact studies (mostly qualitative)
4. Sources with information on the costs of certification
5. Sources that appeared relevant but for which the methodology used was 
not clear. 
In our assessment we focused on papers in: Categories 1 and 2 for information 
on impact (and costs) and Category 4 papers with information on costs. 
Table 1: CerTifiCaTion sysTems 
and seCTors under review
Certification system Cocoa Coffee Cotton Fruit & 
vegetables
4C • X • •
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) • • X •
Cotton Made in Africa (CMiA) • • X •
Fairtrade X X X X
GLOBALG.A.P. • • • X
Organic X X X X
Rainforest Alliance (RA) X X • X
UTZ Certified (UTZ) X X • •
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Category 1 papers are usually peer-reviewed; Category 2 papers are not 
always peer-reviewed. While the quality of top-graded academic papers is 
usually high, grey literature and interviews were still required as academic 
publications typically lag behind field developments by three to five years 
(see Appendix 4 for detailed categorisation of all of the reviewed studies).
Given the methodological limitations of the Category 2 impact studies, the 
benefits they identify should be considered as indicative only. By refraining 
from using groups of non-certified farmers who are otherwise similar to the 
certified farmers, or by failing to track changes over time, positive changes 
cannot be credibly attributed to a certification programme. Changes 
might have been caused by the tendency of certificate-holders (farmers, 
producer organisations or companies that own the certificate) to work 
with more productive farmers, or by changes in rainfall from one year to 
another. Conclusions on impact are only made where there are studies with 
quantitative assessments, in which similar certified and non-certified farmers 
are compared at at least two points in time. We have not included literature 
review papers and reports in our analyses, but have based our assessment on 
original sources reporting on certification impacts.
2.3  Which indicator categories are assessed?
In this study we have analysed information on the following indicator 
categories related to benefits:
• agronomy and the environment, including production, productivity, quality, 
farming efficiency and improvements related to soil, water and biodiversity
• economic aspects, including market access, prices, production costs, and 
income
• access to services, including organisational development, training, credit 
and inputs
• social aspects, including child labour, health and other social effects. 
For each sector, the number and percentage of studies with evidence of impact 
on these indicators is presented, and overall conclusions on impact are drawn.
2.4  How are certi f ication costs calculated and 
presented?
In this study we aim to provide a complete picture of certification costs 
per farmer. Cost data were compiled for each certification scheme and 
an attempt was made to break down costs into specific items and make a 
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distinction between upfront and recurring costs. Where possible, information 
on certification costs per farmer is presented for both farmers and certificate-
holders. All cost data are converted to 2014 Euro values. 
Table 2 shows the costs that are likely to be incurred when implementing 
certification and which we take into account. Not all cost items listed in Table 
2 are applicable to each certification scheme. Fairtrade and GLOBALG.A.P. 
for example are the only schemes for which a registration fee is payable. 
As little information on costs was available from the literatureiii, we do not 
present costs for individual certification schemes, but we calculated average 
certification costs for all of the schemes combined. We indicate which 
certification scheme(s) costs have been included in the calculations.  
Costs are presented in the text as total certification costs per farmer, at 
farmer and/or certificate-holder level. The cost figures can be either a single 
cost figure or a range of costs, indicating a range with average minimum 
iii In many studies in which certification costs were mentioned, the information was often not 
detailed enough to calculate certification costs per farmer for either certificate-holders or 
farmers. In some studies, no details on units of measurement were found, or cost figures were 
based on assumptions instead of empirical data.
Table 2: CosT iTems and CosT Type  
(upfronT and/or reCurring)
Cost item Cost type
Yield loss during conversion period Upfront investment
Set up internal control or management system Upfront investment
Registration fee Upfront & recurring
Materials Upfront & recurring
Infrastructure Upfront & recurring
Transport Upfront & recurring 
Staff training Upfront & recurring
Producer training Upfront & recurring
External audit Upfront & recurring
Management attention Upfront & recurring
Operation of internal control or management system Recurring
Laboratory analysis Recurring
Health check Recurring
Service delivery to producers (other than training) Recurring
Separating certified and non-certified product flows at farm, in transit, 
during processing, warehousing and export
Recurring
Premium payments Recurring
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and maximum costs found. Single cost figures are presented when only cost 
information from one study was available.  
In Appendix 3, detailed information on average costs found in the literature 
is presented for each commodity, disaggregated by upfront and recurring 
costs, if such information is available. A total certification cost figure is 
presented. The total average cost and the sum of the average costs of the 
individual cost items are sometimes different. This is because not all studies 
provide a detailed cost breakdown; some provide only one figure for total 
certification costs. Thus the total average certification costs presented can 
be higher than the sum of the individual cost items. Appendix 4 contains 
information on which studies make reference to certification costs.
We find that the cost of implementation of certification appears to be 
primarily a function of the number of farmers that are certified. The volume 
of produce that is certified, the share of that volume that is sold as certified 
and any price differentials that may apply, determine to what extent the 
costs are recouped or profit is made. The volume of certified produce 
per farmer is a key determinant in analysing the potential profitability of 
implementing certification. We finalise our assessment for each commodity 
by calculating the volume-based break-even points at farm level. The break-
even volume is calculated for two cost scenarios: the minimum certification 
cost and the maximum certification cost. This leads to insights into the 
production volumes at farm level that are required for certification to 
become financially viable. Our break-even analysis is not based on average 
certification cost figures, as an extremely wide range of certification costs 
has been found in our assessment.
In the break-even analysis, upfront investment in durable assets such as 
storage rooms or other infrastructure is amortised over eight years. All other 
upfront investment is amortised over three years. The financial benefits are 
calculated using information on premiums received per unit produced by 
certificate-holders and farmers and the average marketability rate, i.e. the 
share of certified product that is actually sold as such.
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3
3.1  History and origins of certi f ication systems
Certification of products and production processes dates back to the early 
1900s. The invention of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser in 1908 by Fritz Haber 
and Carl Bosch led to dramatic changes in agriculture. For the first time in 
history, yields could reliably be increased to unprecedented levels. A large 
share of the world population growth (from 1.6 bn in 1900 to over 6 bn 
today) can be credited to their invention. Around the same time, a group of 
farmers averse to the use of synthetic fertiliser and pesticides came together 
under the Demeter International label in Germany. Thus the world’s first 
certification programme was born. Initiatives in other countries blossomed 
and developed. The organic movement received an impetus with the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1963. It described a future 
where accumulation of pesticides such as DDT led to a world where bird 
and fish populations were threatened and where people were eventually 
at risk. In 1972, a number of national organic movements formed the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM).
Up until the late 1980s, organic certification was the single most important 
agricultural certification scheme. The notion of fair trade had been around 
since the 1950s, with civic organisations trying to procure products from 
producer groups in developing countries. In 1987, the market share for ‘fairly 
traded’ coffee in the Dutch coffee market was no more than 0.2%. This was 
about to change. In late 1988, the first Fairtrade certified products appeared 
in Dutch supermarkets. By the end of 1989, Max Havelaar coffee captured 
1.7%, a 9-fold growth in 1 year. Up to the mid-1990s, Fairtrade volumes grew 
continuously. Its market share in the Dutch market is currently around 4%. 
From coffee, Fairtrade expanded into other product categories such as 
fruit, cotton, cocoa and flowers. Today Fairtrade certifies 15 different single 
products and numerous composite ones; i.e. products with a minimum of 
20% Fairtrade components by weight or volume.
Up until the 1990s, organic certification and the recently started fair trade 
History 
and aims of certification systems
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movement were the primary agricultural certifiers. In the 1990s, growing 
concerns over food safety, workers’ rights, deforestation and farmers’ 
livelihoods led to a substantial number of new certification initiatives. The 
Rainforest Alliance certified its first farm (a large-scale banana plantation) 
in 1993. UTZ Certified started in 1998 as the result of a collaboration between 
a Guatemalan coffee grower and Ahold, a Dutch retailer. GLOBALG.A.P. 
(then known as EUREPGAP) started around the same time as an initiative of 
European retailers in the horticultural sector.
Towards the end of the 1990s and during the next decade, the certification 
movement gained momentum, growing from a relatively niche market to 
becoming increasingly mainstream. Several companies had shown time 
and again that responsible behaviour towards suppliers was apparently 
difficult to reconcile with their obligation to make profits. Under pressure 
from NGO campaigns, companies in sectors ranging from sportswear 
(e.g. Nike), to coffee and many others, felt the need to demonstrate how 
their decisions were affecting their suppliers’ living conditions and the 
environment. In the coffee sector, the Oxfam report  Mugged: Poverty in your 
coffee cup 5 held coffee roasting companies responsible for the hardship in 
origin countries caused by low world market prices around the turn of the 
century. In response, companies started to integrate fair trade, organic and 
other certified products in their commercial portfolios. Others engaged in 
partnerships with NGOs and developed internal codes of conduct. These 
developments proved instrumental for certification agencies; their number 
and share in consuming markets grew rapidly (Figure 1).
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Companies buying certified products use the certificate as an insurance 
policy as it demonstrates their commitment to responsible sourcing. As many 
of the certification agencies use third-party audits of certified producers, 
this makes their claims about responsible sourcing more robust. In return for 
the assurance that their suppliers are delivering sustainable or safe products, 
companies pay a fee to the certifier and/or the producer, or those that 
represent the certificate-holder. 
For some, especially in the private sector, the position of premium payments 
is under discussion. Their arguments vary, but is essentially that: ‘producers 
benefit from being certified; paying a premium for certified products is 
therefore not needed’. Other companies who are concerned with supply 
see certification and accompanying interventions as a way of securing 
supply by forging tighter bonds with producers. In the cocoa sector this 
argument is frequently used and has sparked substantial investment in 
production improvements by cocoa trading and processing companies 
such as Cargill, ADM and Olam. Coffee saw a similar development, albeit less 
driven by supply anxiety, at least initially. In 2010 and 2011, coffee became a 
sellers’ market, leading to increased unease among buyers; producers were 
satisfied with price levels at that time. As so often happens, high price levels 
led to increased husbandry of existing plantations and establishment of 
new ones. So, despite strong growth in certified supply, conventional supply 
has expanded also and today there is nearly as much conventional coffee 
available as there was ten years ago.
3.2  business models of certi f iers
Two different business models dominate the certification sector. The most 
common model is one where manufacturers pay a membership or volume-
based fee. Fairtrade and UTZ have business models that rely in part on 
payments from such members. The other business model relies on fees paid 
by certified producers for services rendered. Rainforest Alliance exemplifies 
this by earning around one-third of its turnover from auditing Rainforest 
Alliance certified farmers. Irrespective of the business model, donor funding 
is important for nearly all of them (Figure 2). Detailed information on the year 
of establishment, governance, business models and supposed benefits of the 
eight certification schemes in this study can be found in Appendix 2.
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Figure 2: Income sources of certifiers for 2011 (Fairtrade: FLO and its country level organisations) 
or 2012 (others) and their turnover (all monetary values in Euros). Differences between turnover 
and sum of sources may occur, as no category ‘other’ has been included. Information on CMiA, 
Organic and GLOBALG.A.P. was not available.
Sources:7
Fairtrade and GLOBALG.A.P.  are the only schemes for which certified 
producers are required to pay a registration fee directly to the certifying 
organisation. The amount received is negligible for Fairtrade and not 
disclosed by GlobalG.A.P.  The majority of Fairtrade’s funding in 2011 came 
from payments by manufacturers that use Fairtrade products, refered to as 
payment from members. Rainforest Allianceiv is the exception in that it does 
not receive fees from companies directly. Around 30% of its 2012 budget was 
derived from fees earned by auditing Rainforest Alliance certified producers 
by its subsidiary called RA Cert. RA Cert operates in a captive market as it is 
the only auditor allowed to audit for Rainforest Alliance.
This market was worth € 16 million in 2012 alone. Fairtrade also earns from 
auditing certified producers through FLO-Cert which is fully owned by 
Fairtrade International, but here the earnings are very limited. Organisations 
that use third party auditing do not have this revenue stream. As noted 
above, all organisations rely on donor funding to varying degrees. Rainforest 
Alliance and Fairtrade are extremely successful in mobilising such funds to run 
their organisations. 
A measure of the efficiency of certification organisations can be the amount 
of turnover of the organisation per farmer certified (Figure 3). 
iv Exceptions are sometimes made, but NGOs that perform the audit instead of RA Cert all 
belong to the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), which in turn owns the RA brand.
4C bCI uTZ RA Fair Trade
 Turnover 1 767 000 3 600 000 6 800 000 36 036 223 58 929 168
 Donors 61 000 1 764 000 1 684 000 19 848 225 17 927 331
 Members 1 548 000 792 000 4 704 000 35 658 892
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Figure 3: Number of beneficiariesv certified versus turnover of the certification organisation in 
2011 (Fairtrade) or 2012 (others), where the size of the bubble represents the organisation’s 
turnover per farmer certified.
The turnover at the organisation is primarily spent on paying staff, marketing 
of the label, standard design and administration. Sums spent by certificate-
holders, donors, companies and farmers to implement certification are not 
covered in this graph. Organisations’ turnover values range from a relatively 
low amount per farmer for 4C to € 49 per beneficiary per year for Fairtrade. 
BCI is high but it should be noted that the € 40 per year per farmer at BCI 
pays for all the audits that take place at farm level. For Rainforest Alliance 
and Fairtrade this is also the case, but here the farmers (or their organisations) 
pay the audit fees to the auditing companies that belong to the (owners 
of the) certification agencies. At BCI, the audit fees are paid by donors 
and businesses that fund BCI. UTZ and 4C appear to be more efficient per 
beneficiary. However, real efficiency can only be judged in relation to the 
benefits that certifying organisations deliver.
v The term beneficiaries is deliberate as this captures both farmers and other types of 
producers. This is important as Fairtrade also covers non-agricultural products.
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3.3  Implementation of certi f ication
Implementation of certification always involves compliance by (groups of) 
certified farmers to a standard, and in most cases a degree of training. In 
principle, any farm could opt to become certified. In reality, farmers need 
sufficient volume of produce over which to spread the implementation costs. 
An individual small-scale farmer typically does not produce enough to make 
certification feasible. In the rare cases that volume is not an impediment to 
becoming certified, the amount of managerial and administrative expertise 
needed might well be. Trading and exporting companies that buy from 
small-scale farmers often bridge the gap in volume and management skills 
by acting as a certificate-holder for a group of farmers. Another option is for 
groups or cooperatives of farmers to hold the certificate. In the case of some 
Fairtrade products such as coffee this is the only way to become certified.vi, 8 
 
A generic implementation model (Figure 4) fits all the certification schemes, 
although implementation details may vary from one standard to another. 
vi The 2011 split between FLO and TransFair USA (now called Fairtrade USA) may bring about 
some change in this. TransFair USA allows farmers who are not part of a cooperative to 
become certified via group certification organised by commercial companies. It is estimated 





• storage of agrichemicals
• record keeping
• ‘proper’ use of inputs
• contracts/payments labourers
• no child labour
• occupational health care
• entrepreneurial skills





















Figure 4: Generic implementation model for certification.  
Source:9
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Implementation typically has two main activities. One is arranging for 
compliance with a code of conduct or standard. A number of requirements 
need to be met such as: establishing record-keeping, proper use of inputs, 
and banning child labour. Farmers usually receive some form of training and 
an internal control or management system (ICS) is implemented to assure 
that compliance is achieved and maintained. This is checked during an audit. 
In addition, most standards require the certificate-holder to provide a number 
of services to the farmers who are part of the certified group. Often this is 
training in occupational health and safety and good agricultural practices, 
but it could also be training in information supply or, in the case of Fairtrade, 
correct spending of the Fairtrade social premium. Compliance with these 
additional criteria is checked during the external audit.
The various certification systems use different ways to certify whether farmers 
comply with the requirements. Usually, audits are conducted by third-party 
auditors, take place every year, and are paid for by certificate-holders 
(farmers, producer organisations, or traders) (Table 3). Donors also provide 
funding to certificate-holders to implement and maintain certification. 
Unfortunately there is no consolidated information on the financial 
commitment towards certification by donor organisations. Not all farmers are 
audited every year; when a group of small-scale farmers is certified under 
group certification, audits typically take place on a randomly selected subset 
of the group. 
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Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance are the only two organisations that do not rely 
on third-party auditors. They require certificate-holders to use companies that 
belong to the same organisation that owns the standard. The rationale is that 
it is easier to control the quality of the audits Rainforest Alliance derives around 
one-third of its annual turnover from earnings from these audits. In the case 
of Fairtrade this is less than 5%. BCI and CMiA absorb the audit costs. In both 
cases, a mix of donor money and fees from companies that use their labels 
are used to pay for the audit. Except for Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade, 
the certificate-holder can choose from a set of auditors accredited by the 
certification organisation. There is competition on price among these auditors.
With the implementation of certification, costs are accrued at different levels 
of the value chain. Most are borne by the certificate-holder (which can be a 
farmer, a producer organisation or a company). Farmers themselves also bear 
some of the costs:  mostly in the form of time spent on training, for which an 
opportunity cost can be calculated, or through hardware investments (Table 4).
In the subsequent sections on different commodities, available details on 
these cost items are discussed.
Table 3: informaTion on audiTs  
per CerTifiCaTion sCheme
Certifier Who conducts audits? How often do audits 
take place?
Who pays for audits?
4C Third-party auditor Once (initial verification) Certificate-holder
Self-assessment Annually
Third-party auditor Every three years
BCI Self-assessment Annually BCI
2nd party credibility 
check by Producer Unit
Annually
Third-party auditor Annually
CMiA Third-party auditor Every 2 years Aid by Trade foundation
Fairtrade FLO-CERT (owned by 
members of Fairtrade 
International)
Annually Certificate-holder
GLOBALG.A.P. Third-party auditor Annually Certificate-holder
Organic Third-party auditor Annually Certificate-holder
Rainforest Alliance RA Cert (owned by RA) 
and founding members 
of the Sustainable 
Agriculture Network
Annually Certificate-holder
UTZ Third-party auditor Annually Certificate-holder
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3.4  Impacts claimed by certi f iers 
Certification systems state different benefits to farmers who participate in 
their programmes. We grouped these claimed benefits in four domains: 
services, agronomy (including environment), economy and social. Counting 
and plotting the number of claims made by certification organisations in 
these four domains provides a sense of where the respective organisations 
expect to make their mark (Figure 5).
Table 4: CosT iTems, enTiTy paying and CosT Type:  
upfronT or reCurring
Cost item Entity paying
Certificate-holder Farmer
Set up internal control or management 
system
Upfront investment •
Operation of internal control or 
management system
Recurring cost Recurring cost
Registration fee, if any Upfront & recurring •
Materials Upfront & recurring Upfront & recurring
Infrastructure Upfront & recurring Upfront & recurring
Staff training Upfront & recurring •
Producer training Upfront & recurring Upfront & recurring
Other service delivery to producers Recurring cost •
External audit Upfront & recurring Upfront & recurring
Premium payments Recurring cost •
Laboratory analysis Upfront & recurring •
Health check Upfront & recurring •
Separating certified and non-certified 
product flows at farm, in transit, during 
processing, warehousing and export
Recurring cost •
Management attention Upfront & recurring Upfront & recurring
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Figure 5: Number of claimed benefits for producers by certification organisations – grouped by 
four domains: services, agronomy and environment, economy and social. 
Sources:10
Contrary to other certification schemes, GLOBALG.A.P.  does not claim any 
benefits for producers. Fairtrade’s claims are modest compared to the 
others. The majority of claims fall in the agronomy and environment domain, 
followed by economy, and social. Claimed benefits in the services domain 
are relatively few. 
The ability of farmers to access services such as training, technical support, 
finance and information is considered by many to be a prerequisite for 
improvement of farming. For some, such as CMiA, the certification programme 
is about making training available to farmers. For others, such as UTZ Certified 
and 4C it is a requirement to be fulfilled by the certificate-holder and 
therefore is not claimed as an impact. Rainforest Alliance has the broadest 
claim in this domain. Participation in its programme is stated to lead to better 
access to finance and more favourable credit options and access to training 
and technical assistance (Table 5).
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Table 5: Claimed benefiTs by CerTifiCaTion  
organisaTions for produCers in The serviCes domain
Claim 4C bCI CMiA Fairtrade G.GAP Organic RA uTZ
Access to information X • • • • • • •
Access to finance / 
favourable credit 
options
• • • • • • X •
Access to training / 
technical assistance
• • X • • • X •
The agronomy and environment domain is where most certification 
organisations expect to make their mark (Table 6). 
Better farm management is claimed by most. As a result of more efficient 
use of inputs, better yields are said to be achieved by all except Fairtrade, 
GLOBALG.A.P.  and Rainforest Alliance. Optimisation of input use is another 
often-claimed benefit. This is expected to result in lowering of pollution and 
preservation of natural resources. Organic certification is the only system that 
expects farms in their programme to become more climate-change resilient.
Changes in farm management are expected to result in a number of 
economic impacts (Table 7).
Table 6: Claimed benefiTs by CerTifiCaTion organisaTions 
for produCers in The agronomy and environmenT domain
Claim 4C bCI CMiA Fairtrade G.GAP Organic RA uTZ
Better farm management X X X • • X X X
Better yields X X X • • X X
Improved quality X • X • • • X X
Increased on-farm 
efficiency 
• X X • • • X •
Climate change 
resilience
• • • • • X • •
Preservation of water, 
natural resources 
• X • X • • X X
Protection of animals, 
plants and nature 
reserves
• X • X • • X X
Reduction of pollution • • • • • X • X
Optimized use of inputs X • X • • X • X
Reduced use of inputs X X • • • • X •
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Reduced costs are claimed by half of the certification organisations. With or 
without better yields, this is expected to result in greater profitability. Fairtrade 
is the only certificate that uses a minimum price and fixed price premium, 
although it does not claim that this leads to greater profitability (or better 
income). Economic claims from Organic are limited to reduced financial risk 
because farmers are not buying chemical inputs anymore. Rainforest Alliance 
is unique in that it claims market access and, specifically, access to premium 
market segments as a tangible benefit. 
Social benefits for producers are thought to occur both as a direct result 
of programme participation and from spin-of effects from economic 
improvements (Table 8).
Table 7: Claimed benefiTs by CerTifiCaTion organisaTions 
for produCers in The eConomiC domain
Claim 4C bCI CMiA Fairtrade G.GAP Organic RA uTZ
Reduced costs X X • • • • X X
Stable prices • • • X • • • •
Fairtrade premium • • • X • • • •
Greater profitability X X X • • • • X
Reduced financial r isk • • • • • X • •
New market opportunities • • • • • X • •
Better access to 
specialty buyers
• • • • • • X •
Premium markets • • • • • • X •
Contract stability • • • • • • X •
Publicity • • • • • • X •
Table 8: Claimed benefiTs by CerTifiCaTion organisaTions 
for produCers in The soCial domain
Claim 4C bCI CMiA Fairtrade G.GAP Organic RA uTZ
Improved livelihoods • • X X • X • •
Empowerment of farmers 
and workers
• • • X • • • •
Cleaner, safer, more 
dignified working place
• • • • • • X •
Feeling healthy, 
motivated and respected
• • • • • • • X
No child labour • X • • • • X X
Better farm organisations X • • • • • • •
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Improved livelihoods are claimed by CMiA, Fairtrade and Organic. What 
constitutes a livelihood and how it will be improved is not usually explained, 
however. More tangible is the Rainforest Alliance claim of a cleaner and safer 
working place. Rainforest Alliance and UTZ are both explicit on avoidance 
or limitation of child labour as a result of programme participation. Most 
of the others have comparable requirements in their standard, but do not 
communicate it as a benefit for producers.
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4.1  Market and sector
Global supply of coffee has increased from around 110 million 60 kg bags 
of green coffee in 2001 to 150 million bags today.11 In the late 1990s and 
during the start of the following decade a thirty-year low in coffee prices 
gave momentum to a nascent certification movement that had started in 
the 1980s with Max Havelaar. Under pressure from NGOs such as Oxfam, the 
five largest multinational coffee roasters, jointly responsible then for 60% of 
demand, committed to addressing the plight of producers. Their response 
consisted of promises to buy increasing volumes of coffee certified as 
sustainable.
Consequently, global supply of certified sustainable coffee rose from about 
1% of the total in 2001 to 9% in 2010. Estimates in that year expected the share 
of certified coffee to rise to 20–25% by 2015.12 However, the 2009–10 estimate 
did not include 4C. Including 4C shows that growth of certified supply has 
been much stronger. In 2012 the share of certified supply reached 38% of 
total supply (Figure 6). An unknown share of certified coffee carries more 
than one certificate. For example, some may be both Fairtrade certified and 
Organic certified. This volume of coffee will then be double counted when 
summing up the volumes that each of the certification organisations claims 
to have certified under its label. Consequently, the volume of certified coffee 
presented in Figure 6 is an overestimation. In the absence of consolidated 
data on volumes and sources from each certification agency, it is difficult 
to adjust the total volume of certified coffee for multiple certification. A poll 
among industry sources leads us to believe that around 25% of supply is 
multiple certified. After controlling for this, our estimate is that 29% of global 
supply is now certified.
4 Coffee
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Figure 6: Total annual coffee supply from 2000 to 2012 split by conventional (i.e. uncertified) 
and certified in million 60 kg bags of green coffee. 
Sources:13
Several certification programmes are active in coffee, but five dominate the 
market. These are 4C, UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic. 
Of these, 4C has seen the strongest growth in supply over the past years 
(Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Supply of certified coffees from 2006 to 2012 in million bags. Data on Organic 
certification for 2011 and 2012 is missing. Note that an unknown share of the volume carries 
more than one certificate. 
Source:14
Consumption of certified sustainable coffees is concentrated in mature 
markets, but large uptake differences exist between national markets. 
Internationally, the Dutch coffee market leads the way with 38% of 
consumption certified as sustainable in 2011 compared with less than 3% 
in 2001. Large companies such as Nestlé and Mondelez have ambitious 
plans for certified sustainable coffee. Nestlé has indicated that all its coffee 
purchased directly from farmers will meet the 4C sustainability standard by 
2015. This is expected to amount to 180,000 t (3 million bags) of green coffee 
annually. It is likely that additional volume sourced from intermediaries will 
also carry the 4C label. In addition, 90,000 t (1.5 million bags) will be sourced 
in accordance with the Rainforest Alliance standard. Mondelez, in turn, has 
expressed the commitment to have all its European coffee brands sustainably 
sourced by 2015, using 4C, Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade systems. DE 
Master Blenders 1753 expects to source 25% of its annual volume as UTZ 
Certified by 2015, which amounts to around 90,000 t.
Despite strong commitments of large buyers, not all certified coffee is sold as 
such. The so-called marketability rate shows the share of certified supply that 
is sold as certified, in most cases against a premium (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Average annual marketability rate of certified coffees from 2006 to 2012. 
Source:15
Unless the coffee market approaches 100% demand for certified coffee, the 
need to discuss the marketability rate is here to stay. Not all coffee is of interest 
to most roasters. Coffee that is harvested at the start or end of the season is 
typically of lower quality. Certain buyers are interested in certain bean sizes, 
qualities, cup profiles, etc. and the lower quality coffees are usually more 
difficult to sell as certified, especially when a premium is expected by the seller. 
The marketability rate varies from year to year. Average rates, excluding 
Organic which is uncharacteristically high, have never surpassed 40% and 
saw a low of 22% in 2007. The 7-year average from 2006 to 2012, excluding 
Organic, is 32%. 
The difficulty for certified companies or groups of producers is that investment 
for certification should be covered by premium payments on only 32% of 
the certified volume, when no other financial benefits of certification occur. 
Only Fairtrade and UTZ Certified require buyers to pay a premium. Rainforest 
Alliance, 4C and Organic do not have this requirement. In today’s market, 
coffee that is sold under any of these three labels trades against a premium 
in most cases.
Marketability rates vary significantly between certificates. The average 
rate over the past seven years for Fairtrade has been relatively high at 34%. 
Organic was extremely high at 81% in 2006, but we are not entirely convinced 
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about the reliability of market data on Organic certification as there appears 
to be no information on volumes. Rainforest Alliance rates have historically 
been high – 47% on average – but dipped sharply from 2011 to 2012. We 
suspect this is because Nestlé and Mondelez are meeting growing shares of 
their sustainability commitments by buying 4C coffee. The marketability rates 
of 4C, despite strong commitment from roasters, is poor at 5% on average. 
Growth in 4C volumes is likely to continue to outpace demand for some time. 
In 2013 4C supply in Vietnam grew by 8.3 million bags. UTZ finds itself between 
the other certificates, with a 7-year average of 25%.
While certified supply appears to be becoming mainstream (Figure 6), 
demand has some way to catch up (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Supply and demand of certified coffees in 2012 in million 60 kg bags of green coffee, 
by certificate. Data on Organic certification is from 2011.
Seventy per cent of coffee is produced by an estimated 20 to 25 million 
small-scale farmers. Some of these farmers are member of cooperatives, but 
the majority operates as individuals. Aside from a lack of management and 
administrative skills, individual smallholder coffee farmers cannot profitably 
access the market for ‘certified sustainables’ because they lack sufficient 
volumes over which to spread implementation costs. Given the large and 
fragmented supply base, addressing demand for certified sustainable coffee 
requires trading and exporting companies to organise producer groups and 
use these as a basis for implementation of certification.
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According to Table 5 to Table 8 (Chapter 3) certification claims to provide 
numerous benefits for producers, ranging from more efficient and higher 
production, to credit access and better health. The next section provides a 
review of the scientific and so-called grey literature and aims to distil the current 
consensus on the effects of certification on small-scale coffee producers.
4.2  benefits for small-scale farmers
We found 110 papers, studies and reports that mention the effects of 
certification programmes on small-scale coffee producers. To identify effects, 
we need studies that use a reliable methodology to describe causal impact 
of certification. This means that studies need to build a credible case for 
what would have happened to a particular farmer had she not joined the 
certification programme. This hypothetical case (‘the counter-factual’) should 
then be compared with the actual situation and the change over time. Most 
studies do not apply this methodology of a credible counter-factual, but 
are nonetheless of interest. Table 9 in Appendix 3 gives an overview of the 
number of studies found and their methodology.
There are just 14 studies on which we can base a judgement of the effects 
of certification of coffee producers, with a further 29 that include relevant 
quantitative information but lack a credible mechanism by which to identify 
causality of effects. Of the 14 studies with credible counter-factuals, Fairtrade is 
the most widely studied certification scheme, followed by Organic (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Share of studies that employ a credible counter-factual scenario to identify causality 
of certification effects by certificate.
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Geographically, the focus of investigation is mostly on Central America with 
nine studies focusing on that region. Of these, four cover Nicaragua, three 
cover Costa Rica and one covers El Salvador. The ninth is a regional study 
covering several countries. South America is covered by two studies in Peru, 
Asia by two studies in Vietnam and Africa by only a single study in Uganda. 
Note that some studies cover more than one country.
Impacts claimed by certification agencies cover a wide range of topics 
and issues. We grouped impact areas and for each impact area defined a 
number of general indicators that capture a substantial share of the claims 
made. The impact areas are: agronomy, economy, services and social effects.
4.2.1  Agronomy
Here we focus on four indicators. These are: productivity, farming efficiency, 
quality and environmental effects (Figure 11).
Figure 11: Effects and direction of effects of certification on 4 agronomy and environment 
indicators, measured by the percentage of studies with credible counter-factual scenarios that 
identify said effects. The table below the graph shows the actual numbers of studies for each 
indicator and type of effect.
Positive impacts are found primarily on quality of produce and environmental 
effects. Farming efficiency, which relates to the amount of inputs used per 
unit of coffee produced, is not affected in any of the studies we identified. 
Improved productivity, an often-claimed benefit is confirmed by a single 
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study. Most studies find the effect of certification on productivity to be neutral, 
while one study identified a negative effect. 
Quality is often self-reported by farmers and not usually corroborated with 
buyers. In Vietnam, for example, quality improvements were reported by 
farmers but this was not reflected by the prices these farmers received.
4.2.2  Economy
This category covers four indicators: market access, price, production cost 
and income (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Effects and direction of effects of certification on 4 economy indicators, measured 
by the percentage of studies with credible counter-factual scenarios that identify said effects. 
The table below the graph shows the actual numbers of studies for each indicator and type 
of effect.
Three studies analysed market access. One found a positive effect of a 
certified cooperative that could access markets that were previously out of 
reach. Typically certificate-holders already have good market access prior to 
certification but manage to sell a share of their coffee as certified afterwards. 
Hence, the majority of studies finds no effect on market access. In markets 
where certificate-holders are overly reliant on a single buyer, there could be 
a negative effect if they lose their current buyer as a result of not being able 
to meet certification standards.
Positive effects on price are found in over 60% of the studies. This is caused 
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to a large degree by the Fairtrade minimum price, although also premium 
payments for Organic, UTZ and Rainforest Alliance certified coffee play a 
role. Price effects appear to be positive, with more than 60% of studies finding 
positive effects.
However, production costs for certified coffees are higher in 40% of the 
studies. This mainly relates to Organic production where increased labour 
costs are usually incurred. Few studies include the implementation costs of 
certification at farm level in addition to production costs. Those that do, tend 
to conclude that certification is at best cost-neutral for farmers, and in some 
cases has a slight negative effect on farm earnings.
Consequently, none of the studies with a credible counter-factual finds 
unambiguous positive effects on income. Despite better prices and premiums 
in a majority of studies, the economic outcome in terms of income is neutral 
in most case as: only a small share of certified production gets sold in 
the certified market; there are occasionally higher production costs; and 
productivity increased significantly in only a few cases.
4.2.3  Services
This category covers four indicators: organisational development; and access 
to training, credit, and inputs (Figure 13).
Figure 13: Effects and direction of effects of certification on 4 services indicators, measured by the 
percentage of studies with credible counter-factual scenarios that identify said effects. The table below 
the graph shows the actual numbers of studies for each indicator and type of effect.
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Organisational development is not affected according to the studies we 
reviewed. For Fairtrade, only producer-owned organisations can be certified, 
so most organisational development takes place prior to certification. More 
development in terms of making farmer organisations more professional may 
take place after becoming certified. Indeed, many report this to be the case, 
but the studies reviewed do not indicate this to be the case when they are 
compared with uncertified farmer organisations. 
With the exception of Fairtrade, exporting companies often organise farmers 
in groups to certify them, and hold the certificate on their behalf. Such set-
ups are typically managed by the company in question, not the farmers 
who are member of the certified group. As such, no positive (or negative) 
organisational development effect was found.
All three studies that reviewed access to training found positive effects. 
Certified farmers have more access to training than uncertified farmers. Such 
training is either provided by the cooperative (usually in the case of Fairtrade 
and Organic) or by the exporting company that holds the certificate in case 
of the other certification schemes.
Better access to credit is claimed by, for example, Rainforest Alliance. One 
study corroborates this finding and two do not. None of the studies finds 
effects on access to inputs.
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4.2.4  Social effects
These include three indicators: child labour, health and social effects (Figure 14).
Figure 14: Effects and direction of effects of certification on three social effects indicators, measured 
by the percentage of studies with credible counter-factual scenarios that identify said effects. The 
table below the graph shows the actual numbers of studies for each indicator and type of effect.
Child labour in coffee does not seem to be affected by certification. In some 
cases, such as in the studies in Vietnam, this is because child labour was not 
an issue prior to farmers becoming certified and hence there was little scope 
for improvement. Of more concern is that in other cases, such as Uganda and 
Nicaragua, the use of child labour was an issue at the start of certification 
and continues to be an issue at the time of this study. 
Positive health effects are found by one study, which argues that a reduction 
in the use of agrochemicals must be better for the health of farmers. We find 
this conclusion to be lacking in substance as application of agrochemicals 
need not be harmful if it is done properly – a practice that most certificates 
are in fact now promoting.
Other significant positive social effects are found by one study, such as better 
educational attainment and the higher likelihood of the children of Fairtrade-
certified farmers attending school/college.
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4.3  Findings from other impact-related studies
With the inclusion of the 29 studies that do not use control groups and 
measurements of the same farmers at different points of time, certification 
delivers more benefits than the picture that emerged in the previous section. 
However, it should be noted that given the methodological limitations of 
these studies, the benefits they identify should be considered as indicative 
only (see Section 2.2). 
Geographically these studies are predominantly applicable to South and 
Central America. Mexico features heavily with five studies, all related to 
Fairtrade. Other countries studied are: Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Rwanda. 
Asia is underrepresented, with just one study in Vietnam. 
The effects of certification on agronomy are overwhelmingly positive in these 
studies. Just one study identified a negative effect on productivity as a result 
of certification.16 This same study also recorded a higher incidence of coffee 
leaf rust in Organic certified farms in Costa Rica. In the light of the current 
outbreak of leaf rust in Central America, this is a distressing finding for Organic 
certified producers and one that goes counter to the claim by Organic 
certification of greater resilience to pests and diseases of Organic production 
systems. Other studies that assessed productivity found mostly positive effects 
of certification. Some authors indicate that they are uncertain whether the 
changes they observed are effects of participation in certification or whether 
the differences already existed before participation started.17 Apart from 
Fairtrade, all certification schemes have studies associated with them that 
highlight positive effects on productivity levels. The view that emerges is that 
the effects of Organic certification on productivity are ambiguous. Around 
half the studies find greater productivity, while the other half find the opposite. 
The view on production costs is also split. Two studies find lower production 
costs for certified farmers, one in Vietnam on UTZ certification, the other in 
Colombia with farmers who participate in the Rainforest Alliance supported 
Nespresso AAA programme.18 Neither one of these studies takes the 
investments that farmers make to become certified into account and so are 
likely to understate the real production costs. Of studies that take a more 
comprehensive view, one finds no effect19 and three studies find negative 
effects of certification on production costs.20
Price increases are found in all Organic studies that examined price, but 
production costs increased also. Consequently, effects on farmer income are 
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neutral or negative in a majority of cases. A determining factor that emerges 
from several studies is the marketability rate, the share of certified product 
that is actually sold as such. Eleven studies find positive income effects from 
certification, six find no effects and two find negative effects.
Access to services, training and credit, in particular, is found in all studies that 
examined these issues. Providing farmers with training is a requirement of all 
certification schemes. When such training goes beyond mere compliance 
with the code of conduct and the associated administrative procedures that 
farmers must follow, additional benefits may accrue. Few authors however 
investigate the contents and quality of training. Fairtrade is unique in that 
it requires buyers of Fairtrade coffee to make available credit to producer 
organisations to finance production. Of the 18 studies that investigated 
Fairtrade, eight find a positive effect on access to credit. Other certification 
schemes do not have this feature and their impact on access to credit 
appears to be far more limited.
4.4  Cost-benefit analysis of coffee certi f ication
A total of 16 studies make reference to implementation costs for coffee. 
Not all certification schemes are equally covered (Table 10 in Appendix 
3). Fairtrade is best covered by the existing literature. 4C stands out as the 
least well-studied certification system in terms of implementation costs. 
Unfortunately, not all 16 studies contain quantitative data on investments 
made and costs incurred. Several discuss costs from a qualitative perspective 
and merely state that costs are high or too high, without further qualification. 
Concrete cost data were sparse and often incomplete. 
Table 11 in Appendix 3 shows a wide range of values for costs accrued by 
the certificate-holder. Depending on the certificate, upfront investment costs 
range from € 33.70 per farmer to € 73.40 at certificate-holder level. Not all 
studies provide a detailed cost breakdown; some provide only one figure 
for total certification costs. What is clear is that the three main cost items are 
training of farmers, set up of the internal control or management system and 
time spent by management. It should be noted that at neither end of the 
cost range are those costs completely accounted for. In reality costs for the 
certificate-holder are likely to be higher than shown here. 
Upfront investment costs for farmers consist of infrastructure investments and 
hardware, and opportunity costs for attending certification related meetings 
and training. Differences occur between certificates. Upfront investment costs 
of € 17.50 per farmer were found. A study in Kenya21 identified significant cost 
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items for compliance with the Rainforest Alliance code of conduct. These 
costs resulted from setting aside land for riparian strips and buffer zones. In 
some cases, cash and food crops had to be uprooted. For one farmer, around 
5% of his coffee trees had to be removed. Unfortunately no cost assessment 
of the loss of productive land was made, but for farmers close to waterways 
this is an item to keep in mind when considering certification.
Data on recurring costs are more patchy than on upfront investment (Table 
12, Appendix 3). At certificate-holder level, individual cost items are found in 
the literature only for the operation of the internal control system, producer 
training and premium payments. Other studies only indicate total certification 
costs without a breakdown. Costs at certificate-holder level range between 
€ 43.59 to 77.69 per farmer. At farmer level, one source indicates total costs of 
€ 18.26, without giving a detailed breakdown of what these total costs entail. 
Similar to the upfront investments, we suspect the actual costs to be higher, at 
least for certificate-holders. 
The average marketability rate – the share of the certified volume that 
gets sold as such – is 32% (Section 4.1). Many, if not all, of the costs for 
implementation are a function of the number of farmers in a certified group. 
Potential earnings are made on the volume of certified produce sold. This 
means that the volume per farmer is a critical factor when determining 
whether or not to invest in certification. Of course other motivations exist. 
Maintaining relations with clients is a commonly cited reason. If we consider 
the financial benefits only we need to make one more assumption: if we take 
an average premium of US$5 t/lb green coffee this translates into € 29.33 per t 
of green coffee in premium received. A second assumption is that the upfront 
costs of € 33.70 to 73.40 are amortised over three years. With these numbers 
it is possible to plot a set of lines that show the production level at which 
certification of farmers becomes financially viable (Figure 15).
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Figure 15: Revenue scenarios at minimum cost per farmer (€ 54.82) and maximum cost per 
farmer (€ 102.16). Marketability is set at 32%, the long run average of all schemes under 
consideration, the average premium is assumed to be $5 t/lb of green coffee. Upfront costs for 
the certificate-holder are amortized over three years.
Figure 15 shows that, to be financially viable, average production per farmer 
needs to be in the range of 1.72 t to 3.48 t of green beans per farmer, 
depending on the level of implementation cost. This has implications for 
origins, where production per farmer is below these figures as is the case in 
many African countries. Such origins would have to rely on donor funding 
or significantly outperform the market in terms of marketability and amount 
of premium received. While this may be possible for some, it is unlikely to be 
possible for all.
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5.1  Market and sector
Global supply of cocoa increased from 4.26m t in 2008 to 5m t in 2012. Cocoa 
is primarily produced in Africa. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are responsible 
for 58% of global supply. Cocoa production is dominated by small-scale 
producers farming less than 5 ha, who are responsible for an estimated 90% of 
global production.22
Similar to coffee, initial certification of cocoa was Organic and became 
available in the late 1980s. Strong growth in the supply of certified cocoa 
took off in 2008. While reports of widespread use of child labour in cocoa 
production had been made since the late 1990s, it took more time before 
certification became a tool for processors and manufacturers to ensure 
sustainable sourcing. A second motivation for investment in cocoa production 
by processors and manufacturers was the perceived supply shortage of 
20% that was expected in 2010. The 2010 shortage was not as severe as 
many expected, but a new shortfall in production is expected by some in 
2020.23 Certification, often in combination with targeted agricultural training 
programmes, is used to support producer organisations and their members, 
to address expected supply shortages and sustainability issues. Cocoa prices 
are volatile and, in contrast with coffee, cocoa producers tend to receive 
a smaller share of the export value. In Ghana, the state marketing agency, 
Cocobod, guarantees a minimum farm-gate price equal to 70% of the world 
market price. In the process, and to finance its own operations, it retains a 
significant portion of the export price. Some of this money is channelled back 
to producers in the form of services. Cocoa farmers in liberalised markets 
such as Cameroon tend to receive better prices than those in Ghana while 
producing lower quality, but do not receive much in terms of support.24 In Côte 
d’Ivoire it is estimated that farmers receive around 60% of the export price.25
The volume of conventionally produced cocoa has remained stable since 
2008 at around 4m t. The share of certified cocoa is around 20% (Figure 16).
5 Cocoa
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Figure 16: Total annual cocoa supply from 2008 to 2012 split by conventional (i.e. uncertified) 
and certified supply in million t of cocoa. Note that this graph does not take multiple 
certification into account.  
Sources:26
The certified cocoa market is dominated by four certification schemes. 
These are UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic. Supply of 
UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance has boomed over the past few years 
(Figure 17) due to substantial commitments to source certified cocoa from 
manufacturers such as Mars, Ferrero and Hershey.
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Figure 17: Supply of certified cocoa from 2008 to 2012 in thousand  t cocoa beans. Data on 
Organic and Fairtrade for 2012 is missing.  
Sources:27
The aforementioned three companies are collectively responsible for 45% of 
the confectioners market, and have committed that 100% of their supply will 
be certified by 2020. Mars is working with UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance and 
Fairtrade to help implement its commitment. Volume-wise, Mars indicates it 
will source at least 100,000 t of UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance certified 
cocoa by 2020. Hershey uses Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa, but does not 
disclose its volumes, beyond its 100% by 2020 commitment. Ferrero sources 
over 100,000 t of cocoa annually. Commitments of certification are met by 
sourcing predominantly UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa. 
In 2012/13 this was expected to account for 25% of total volume. Another 
15% is guaranteed to be traceable by suppliers or sourced through projects. 
Other large manufacturers such as Nestlé and Mondelez have no overall 
commitments on the share of their supply that will be sourced as certified.
Marketability rates, or the percentage of certified cocoa that is actually sold 
as such, vary from one certification scheme to another, but an average figure 
of 29% applied in 2012 (Figure 18).
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Figure 18: Average annual marketability rate of certified cocoa from 2008 to 2012.  
Source:28
UTZ Certified had the lowest marketability rate in 2012 at 22%. Its rate has 
been stable over the past three years, which points to a consistent mismatch 
between supply and demand. Rainforest Alliance has seen similar growth 
in supply to UTZ, but in 2012 its marketability rate crashed from over 70% to 
less than 40%. This is still better than UTZ, but producers faced increasing 
problems selling their Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa. As with coffee, 
the marketability rate for Organic is very high. We are not entirely confident 
about the quality of data on certified Organic production.
Companies, cooperatives and other organisations working to implement 
certification in cocoa have to try to recoup their investments from premiums 
and perhaps yield, quality and security of supply improvements. The premiums 
are earned on 47% of the certified volume (long-run average) that gets sold 
as such. The remainder is sold against conventional prices. 
As the marketability rate shows, demand has some way to catch up. In 
absolute figures the dominance of UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance is 
evident on the supply side, but less so on the demand side (Figure 19).
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Figure 19: Supply and demand of certified cocoa in 2012 (UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance) 
and 2011 (Fairtrade and Organic) by certificate. 
Source:29
We expect demand for UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance certified 
cocoa to grow strongly, as large manufacturers such as Mars, Hershey and 
Ferrero strive to meet their certification targets using these two certification 
schemes. Hershey has expressed commitment towards Fairtrade, although 
without specifying volume targets. Ferrero recently started a pilot project with 
Fairtrade certification.30
The cocoa sector faces two main challenges. On the one hand, there are 
continuing concerns about where future supply will come from. Productivity  
in West Africa averages 450 kg/ha31 whereas optimal agronomic management 
and conditions could result in triple that amount. Farmers are said to be 
ageing and children of farmers are reportedly reluctant to follow in their 
parents’ footsteps as cocoa farmers. On the other hand, poverty among 
cocoa producers is widespread, contributing to the use of undesirable  
labour practices.
According to the claims by certification agencies on the effects of their 
programmes these issues should be addressed through certification. In the 
next section we review the evidence to support those claims.
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5.2  benefits for small-scale farmers
We found 31 papers, studies and reports that mention the costs or effects of 
certification programmes on small-scale cocoa producers. To identify effects 
we need studies that investigate causal impacts of certification. Several 
studies do not create a credible counter-factual but are nonetheless of 
interest. 
Table 13 in Appendix 3 gives an overview of the number of studies found. We 
found one study on which to base a credible judgement of the effects of 
certification of cocoa producers, namely a study on organic certification of 
small-scale cocoa farmers in Uganda.32 We will present information from that 
study in this section to indicate impact related to cocoa certification. 
The study focuses on impacts on economic indicators, and specifically on 
revenue effects, but has also found impact on access to services. The issues of 
agronomy and social effects are not covered by this study, and are therefore 
not covered in the coming sections.
5.2.1  Economy
The revenue effects of certified Organic contract farming and of the use 
of Organic farming methods was assessed in Uganda, in comparison with 
‘organic by default’ conventional farming systems without contractual 
relations. Three indicators were assessed: changes in prices, revenues and 
training participation. The study finds that participation in the certified 
organic contract scheme leads to increases in prices and net cocoa (and 
vanilla) revenues by, on average, 150%. Positive revenue effects were found 
from applying organic farming techniques. Such effects are more modest 
than programme participation effects, and increase with the number of 
techniques used simultaneously. 
Even though the profitability of certified Organic farming is better compared 
to organic farming by default, the increase in profitability is connected to the 
contract farming scheme in which certified Organic farming is implemented. 
Because of this contract farming arrangement, farmers are sure of a 
marketing channel including premium payments when quality requirements 
are met. Price premiums for high quality produce taken up in the contracts 
are, according to the authors, instrumental for reaching impact, compared 
to contract schemes in general (whether for organic or conventional crop 
production). Thus, the effects found cannot be solely attributed to Organic 
certification.
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5.2.2  Services
The study finds that certified Organic farmers had more access to training 
than non-certified farmers. This is because in the certified Organic contract 
farming scheme, participants were exposed to yield enhancing farming 
techniques, which resulted in farmers increasing their incomes from both 
cocoa and vanilla. 
5.3  Findings from other impact-related studies
There are few quantitative studies on cocoa certification impacts and 
costs compared to literature on coffee certification. In addition to the study 
described in the previous section, we found five other documents with 
quantitative information that indicate the possible impact of six certification 
schemes in cocoa, two of which cover more than one certification scheme. 
Two sources relate to Fairtrade certification (in Ecuador and Ghana), two to 
Rainforest Alliance certification (Côte d’Ivoire) and two to Organic certification 
(Ecuador and Uganda). We also found one source in which impacts are 
presented of a programme in Indonesia in which one-third of 60,000 
households became certified Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance or UTZ producers.33 
But no information was available in this source on the impact of individual 
certificates. As described earlier, information on impacts from these five studies 
are indicative only, as the impacts they describe cannot be attributed to the 
certification programmes because of methodological constraints. 
Two studies found a positive impact on productivity; one of the studies 
also reported an increase in prices. But these effects translated to income 
increases only in one study,34 probably because they were also combined 
with farm efficiency improvements, as the other study reported an increase 
in production costs. Three out of five studies found neutral impacts on income 
from certification. One factor that could explain the neutral effect on income 
in one of the studies was the low marketability rate (between 7 and 30%) for 
certified Fairtrade cocoa in Ghana,35 limiting the potential of producers to 
recover certification costs. Two studies found a positive impact of certification 
on access to training, one a positive effect on the environment. Other studies 
did not measure effects on these indicators. The social effects that were 
assessed in two studies were found to be either neutral or positive. 
5.4  Cost-benefit analysis of cocoa certi f ication
For cocoa, 15 reports were found that present information on certification 
costs. We have also received information on costs through personal 
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communication. UTZ and Rainforest Alliance are most frequently covered by 
the reports, Fairtrade and Organic are less covered (Table 14, Appendix 3). 
Not all reports contain quantitative data on costs which we could use for our 
analyses, but information on costs from just four sources was used. Information 
from the other studies was not specific enough. 
Most sources do not contain certifcation cost data (Table 15, Appendix 3). 
The data that does exist shows a wide range of values for costs accrued by 
the certificate-holder. 
Upfront costs for UTZ certification range from € 25.76 to 106.74 per farmer 
at certificate-holder level. The only detail on costs found was costs of staff 
training; the other studies presented total certification costs. From the 
sources it is clear that the certification costs mentioned are not completely 
accounted for. This may lead one to believe that the upfront costs are 
higher. Companies who could efficiently implement certification sometimes 
do not have detailed data readily available or are not willing to provide 
detailed cost information for competitive reasons. Weighing up these 
two considerations, we believe the cost range presented to be a close 
approximation of actual costs. We do not however have empirical data to 
back up this claim. Data on recurring costs is available in more detail than 
information on upfront investment (Table 16, Appendix 3). Recurring costs 
range between € 6.29 and 164.55 per farmer for certificate-holders.
Data on upfront costs for farmers are € 80.78 per farmer. Recurring costs for 
farmers are € 54.66 per year. With an amortisation period of three years for the 
upfront costs, the farmer would spend € 81.58 in total annually. The majority of 
these costs are made up of time invested by farmers, which are valued at the 
usual hired labour rates. 
The average marketability rate is 47% (Section 5.1). Most implementation 
costs are a function of the number of farmers in a certified group. Potential 
earnings are primarily made on the volume of certified produce sold. The 
volume per farmer is a critical factor which determines whether or not the 
farmer will invest in certification. 
If we consider just the financial aspects we need to make one more 
assumption; if we take an average total premium of € 196 per t, this 
translates into € 93 per t of cocoa in premium received, after adjusting for 
the marketability rate. By amortising upfront costs for certificate-holders and 
farmers over three years and adding the annual recurring cost for each party, 
an annual cost is estimated that applies to the first three years of operation. 
52 C O S T S  A N D  B E N E F I T S  O F  C E R T I F I C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
We do this for both the minimum and maximum cost levels that we found. With 
these figures, we have plotted a graph that shows what volume per farmer 
is required to reach break-even, for minimum and maximum cost scenarios, 
when costs of certificate-holders and farmers are combined (Figure 20).
Figure 20: Revenue scenarios at minimum cost per farmer (€ 103.91) and maximum cost per 
farmer (€ 254.72) at combined certificate-holder and farmer level. Marketability is set at 47%, the 
long-run average of all schemes under consideration, the average premium is assumed to be 
€ 196 per t. Upfront costs for the certificate-holder are amortised over three years.
Figure 20 shows that for the combined investment of certificate-holder and 
farmer to be financially viable, the average annual production per farmer 
needs to be in the range from 1.12 to 2.77 t of cocoa beans, depending on 
the level of implementation cost.
The situation for the certificate-holder alone is somewhat different. Due to 
relatively lower upfront costs, a certificate-holder can already reach break-
even when volumes per farmer are 0.49 t, under the minimum implementation 
cost scenario and assuming that 50% of the marketability rate adjusted 
premium is retained by the certificate-holder.
For farmers, the situation is less re-assuring. If all their time invested is valued 
at going labour rates and assuming the certificate-holder passes on 50% 
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of the adjusted premium, then a farmer would only reach break-even at a 
production level of 1.77 t.
 
With declining average marketability rate since 2011, and the fear that 
premium payments are under pressure because certified cocoa is reaching 
a high market share, the amount of cocoa that needs to be produced per 
farmer to recoup certification costs is likely to increase in the short- to mid-term. 
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6.1  Market and sector
Cotton is produced in a wide range of different production systems, ranging 
from rain-fed small-scale production in West Africa, to highly mechanized 
and input intensive production in the USA. Over 100 million family farms are 
engaged in cotton production. Global production of cotton lint grew strongly 
from 14 million t in the early 1980s to a record 26 million t in 2005.36 After a 
dip in 2009, it again approached 26 million t in 2012. A major price spike in 
2011 when cotton went from around US$90 per pound in mid-2010 to US$225 
per pound in early 2011 certainly contributed to the current record crop. 
The global acreage planted with cotton is stable. Although planted areas 
in some countries have reduced, notably in the USA and North Africa, other 
regions have seen strong growth. The long-run average is 32.7 million ha. 
This implies that supply growth has come mostly from improved yields, not 
increases in planted area. The exception is Africa, where productivity has 
been low and stable and any production increases are attributable to an 
increase in planted area.
The global cotton market has seen major shifts in supply and demand over 
the past 15 years. China, the world’s largest producer, has seen tremendous 
growth in supply with an annual growth ratevii of 4.6% from 1999 to 2012. Yet 
over the same period, its imports grew from around 46,000 t to 3.36 million t – 
an annual growth rate of 43%.37 
Around half of the global cotton acreage is irrigated, contributing to an 
estimated 70% of supply. Virtually none of the irrigated cotton originates from 
Africa. Cotton production relies heavily on water, pesticides and fertiliser. 
Around 10% of biocidesviii are used in cotton production although cotton uses 
only 0.7% of the world’s agricultural area. The development of certified cotton 
vii   We use the compound annual growth rate which represents the average growth rate over a 
specific period of time.
viii Biocides is the collective name for pesticides, fungicides, herbicides and nematocides.
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originates from environmental concerns, although more recently, labour issues 
in Burkina Faso and Uzbekistan have caused some concern.38
Certified cotton is a relatively recent phenomenon with certified Organic 
cotton launched in 1990. Fairtrade cotton was first marketed in 200539 and 
more recent entrants are the Better Cotton Initiative and Cotton Made in 
Africa, both in 2009.40 
While growth rates for certified cotton are substantial (over 50% from 2011 to 
2012), the share of total production is still limited (Figure 21). 
Figure 21: Total annual cotton supply from 2008 to 2012 split by conventional and certified 
cotton in million t. 
Source:41
Organic and Fairtrade were the first initiatives in the market, but cotton 
certification is currently dominated by BCI, in particular, and CMiA to a lesser 
degree (Figure 22).
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Figure 22: Supply of certified cotton from 2008 to 2012 in thousand t lint. 
Source:42
Both the market share and the absolute volumes of Organic and Fairtrade 
cotton have declined over the past few years. This decline coincides with 
strong growth of BCI and CMiA. From a peak in 2009 Fairtrade volumes have 
declined by nearly 30%.43 BCI, in particular, has an aggressive growth strategy. 
It aims to reach 2.5 million t by 2015 and 10 million t by 2020. Growth can be 
partly met by the agreement between BCI and CMiA that allows the latter 
to have its certified cotton sold as BCI. Given BCI’s current reliance on donor 
funding for 25% of its budget, it would probably need to generate more 
revenue from its commercial partners. The outlook for that may not be too 
bad as large users of BCI cotton, such as Ikea, aim for 100% of BCI cotton in 
their products by 2015. The fashion brand H&M aims to have all its cotton from 
more sustainable sources by 2020, using BCI, Organic and recycled cotton, 
without listing specific targets for each of these. Others, such as Nike, have not 
made measurable public commitments with regard to certified cotton.44
Based on sales from the certificate-holder to the cotton gin, the marketability 
rate was an average of 52% from 2008 to 2012. In 2012 the average was 
48%. Differences between certificates are not so large, with the exception of 
Organic (Figure 23).
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Figure 23: Average annual marketability rate of certified cotton from 2008 to 2012.  
Sources: 45
While the gin uptake of certified cotton is high and has been over 40% 
for the past two years, the uptake by retailers is lagging behind. For 2012, 
21% of the volume bought as BCI by gins is bought by retailers as BCI 
cotton. That translates into 10% of the available volume of BCI cotton.46 
Unlike coffee, cocoa and Organic and Fairtrade cotton, farmers and their 
organisations do not have to rely on premium payments to cover their costs 
of implementation. In the short-term, a low uptake of BCI cotton by retailers 
does not immediately affect the financial position of farmers. In the mid- to 
long-term, such a situation may not be sustainable when the expected 
benefits of BCI implementation at farm level do not occur. To finance its 
ambitious expansion strategy, BCI seeks to introduce a volume-based fee in 
2015, to be paid by retailers and brands that use BCI cotton.47 We are not 
sure how the new business model will affect the market uptake of BCI cotton, 
especially if costs for retailers and brands increase.
Cotton Made in Africa (CMiA) is the only other certification scheme in cotton 
that has seen growth, even if it’s weaker than BCI. It focusses on small-scale 
producers in West and Southern Africa and around 15% of Africa’s cotton 
lint production was certified CMiA in 2012. Uptake of CMiA cotton by the 
market has been stable at 42% since its first entry into the market. Interestingly, 
CMiA has the same marketability rate of 42% each year. Retailers and brands 
that use the CMiA label in their sustainability commitment are: Puma, C&A, 
Engelbert Strauss and Bon Prix, among others.48 
Supply and demand for organic stands out, with a high share of certified 
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volume sold as such. However the impact on farmers remains limited due to 
the small absolute volume traded (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Supply and demand of certified cotton in thousand  t lint in 2012.  
Source:49
The next section provides a review of the scientific evidence for a positive 
impact of the various cotton certification schemes on farmers’ livelihoods.
6.2  benefits for small-scale farmers
We found 38 papers, studies and reports that mention the effects of 
certification programmes on small-scale cotton producers. Table 17 in 
Appendix 3 gives an overview of the number of studies found.
We found only one study on which we can base a reliable judgement of the 
effects of certification of cotton producers. This is a study on the effects of 
Fairtrade on Malian cotton quality.50 There are also 10 studies that include 
relevant quantitative information but lack a credible mechanism by which 
to identify causality of effects. Eight of them cover Organic certification, 
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one covers both Organic and Fairtrade certification and one Fairtrade 
certification. Quantitative impact studies have not been found for CMiA 
and BCI, probably because cotton under these certification systems came 
relatively recently to the market, in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
Countries that are covered in the 11 studies that are examined in this report 
are: India (5), Mali (2), Burkina Faso (2), Kyrgyzstan (2), Benin (1), Senegal (1) 
and Cameroon (1); one-third of the studies were conducted in India (some 
studies contain information on certification programmes in several countries). 
As in the chapters on coffee and cocoa, we intended to report the impact 
study results for the following impact areas: agronomy, economy, services and 
social effects. For cotton, however, data were only found for the agronomy 
and economy impact areas.
6.2.1  Agronomy
Here we focus on four indicators: productivity, farming efficiency, quality 
and environmental effects. The study on Fairtrade cotton in Mali specifically 
focussed on cotton quality and found that Fairtrade certified farmers 
produced cotton of higher quality than non-certified farmers. Cotton quality 
did not necessarily increase because of certification as such, however. As part 
of the implementation of certification, buyers drew up contracts with cotton 
producers. These contracts, apart from containing clauses on certification, 
also specified minimum quality standards that farmers were expected to 
achieve. Consequently, cotton quality improved. The positive effect on quality 
could have been reached solely because of the contractual arrangement 
used. One could also argue that certification functioned as a catalyst in this 
case, for without it, it is unlikely that such contracts would have been made. 
The study took place at producer organisation level and did not include 
assessments of productivity, farm efficiency and environmental effects.  
6.2.2  Economy
The category economy covers four indicators: market access, price, 
production cost and income. Only information on prices was found. In the 
study on Fairtrade cotton from Mali, Fairtrade certified farmers receive a 
higher price for their cotton, a result of the increase in cotton quality. Impacts 
on market access, production costs and farm incomes were not assessed in 
the study. 
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6.3  Findings from other impact-related studies
Information from 10 studies without a credible counter-factual scenario 
indicates the possible impact of, in particular, Organic certification (nine 
studies) and Fairtrade certification (two studies; one study concerns both 
Organic and Fairtrade certification).
Half of the studies show that certified producers have a lower productivity 
than non-certified ones, and that in more than a third of the studies, no 
difference in productivity is found. Organic certified farmers have a higher 
productivity than non-certified farmers in only 13% of cases. These lower 
productivity rates for certified farmers do not result in lower farm incomes, as 
certified producers have lower production costs and receive higher prices 
for their cotton than non-certified farmers, although the premium is a small 
percentage of total income. In most cases, farm income is higher for certified 
farmers than for conventional farmers. Conversion to certified Organic 
production leads to income loss in the first few years. Production declines as 
farmers stop using fertilisers and pesticides, and they are not immediately 
allowed to sell their cotton in the organic market. None of the studies 
appears to have taken this effect adequately into account in their income 
calculations. 
Regarding production costs, there is consensus that total production costs 
decrease with Organic (and Fairtrade) certification. However, some studies 
reviewed here show a decrease in labour used in cotton production by 
Organic farmers when compared with non-certified farmers, while others 
show an increase. The authors of two studies connect the latter phenomenon 
with negative impacts on gender relations, as women do most of the work in 
cotton production. Because of certification, women become burdened with 
extra tasks, in addition to their already full schedule. Another social effect that 
seems to be connected to certified cotton production is an improvement in 
health because of a reduction in the use of biocides. 
Only two studies look at access to training or credit; both find that Organic 
farmers have better access to training and credit than non-certified farmers. 
6.4  Cost-benefit analysis of cotton certi f ication
Eleven studies make reference to implementation costs and we have also 
received information on costs through personal communication. Organic and 
Fairtrade certification are best covered by the existing literature, while CMiA 
and BCI certification are less well covered in terms of implementation costs 
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(Table 18, Appendix 3). Information on costs from three sources was used, 
because the other information was not specific enough. No information was 
found on upfront cotton certification costs.
 
Some data on recurring costs was available, but it was mostly in the form 
of totals, and was not broken down by specific items, except for external 
auditing costs (Table 19, Appendix 3). Recurring costs for cotton certification 
range from € 19.08 to 72.23 per farmer for certificate-holders and between 
€ 37.04 and 121.51 per farmer for farmers. We suspect that all certification 
costs are not included at either ends of these ranges. 
As we saw in Section 6.1, the average marketability rate for cotton is 52% 
(long-run average). Contrary to the other commodities discussed, premiums 
do not feature in all cotton certification schemes. Both BCI and CMiA 
rely on donor funding and payments from manufacturers to finance their 
programme. Except for the time farmers invest, virtually all certification costs 
are covered by these programmes. Organic and Fairtrade do not cover 
costs for farmers or certificate-holders. In those situations premiums are more 
important for financial viability.
We have conducted the break-even analysis for Organic cotton certification 
in which it is assumed that a premium applies. We chose Organic certification 
for our analyses as: i) no cost information on Fairtrade is available, and ii) 
certification costs for BCI and CMiA certification are usually borne by the 
programmes. 
Organic premiums are said to range from 5 to 20% of the Cotlook A 
benchmark price for lint. Other values for Organic premiums mention € 55.97 
per t lint at farm level, which, assuming an equal distribution between farmer 
and certificate-holder, would translate to € 112 per t lint at certificate-holder 
level, or around 10% of the Cotlook A price. After adjusting for marketability 
and with a combined certificate-holder and farmer cost assessment, 
production per farmer would have to be  equivalent to 1 t lint to reach break-
even in the low-cost scenario and 4.15 t in the high-cost scenario (Figure 25).
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Figure 25: Revenue scenarios at minimum cost per farmer (€ 56.13) and maximum cost per 
farmer (€ 232.81) at farmer level. Marketability is set at 52%, the long run average of all schemes 
under consideration. The average premium is assumed to be € 112 per t (at farm level). Upfront 
costs for the certificate-holder are assumed to be zero.
When assessing the break-even point for certificate-holders, we find 
that a volume of 680 kg lint per farmer is sufficient under the minimum 
implementation cost scenario, while close to 4 t is required if the maximum 
cost scenario is applied. For farmers, the break-even in the minimum cost 
scenario is significantly higher, at 1.32 t lint equivalent and 4.34 t if maximum 
cost is used.
No premium applies where farmers become BCI or CMiA certified. If 
certification costs are no longer borne by the respective programmes, 
farmers would need to produce higher volumes to recover certification costs 
than the 1.32 t and 4.34 t of lint mentioned above, if all else remains the 
same. These break-even volumes could also decrease if the programmes 
achieve the expected impacts at farm level, such as reduced costs and 
higher profitability.  
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The fruit and vegetable sectors cover a wide range of individual products that 
originate from vastly differing production systems. While reviewing the impact 
studies, we noted that, despite the diversity of these sectors, they are often 
discussed under the same heading. This is why, for the impact review, we do not 
split fruit and vegetables into separate sections. In the market review section 
and the cost of implementation sections we provide a separate review of the 
banana and vegetable subsectors, where certification is most prevalent.
Certification is implemented in some fruit subsectors, particularly those where 
a share of production is destined for export. The sectors where certification is 
better known are: banana, grapes, pineapple and citrus. The acreage devoted 
to certified production is less than 5% of the total for these crops (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Share of global acreage certified in 2012, by selected fruit crops. 
Sources:51
7 Fruit and vegetables
65c h a p t e r  7
Of these crops and in the light of this review, banana is the most important 
as measured by the acreage on which it is planted: 4.7 million ha compared 
to 3.8 for citrus and less than 1 million for pineapple. Detailed information 
on certified production in citrus and pineapple is very scarce. Against this 
background, the focus of the market section is on bananas whereas the 
section on benefits for small-scale farmers covers the literature on certification 
in the wider tropical fruit section. The global figures presented here tend 
to disguise national sectors that look markedly different. The Dominican 
Republic, for example, sees a far greater share of certified banana 
production than the averages presented in this chapter. 
7.1  Market and sector -  Fruit
Global supply of bananas increased from 80 million t in 2005 to over 100 
million t in 2012, an average annual growth rate of 3.5%.52 Around one-third 
of this growth originated from expansion of acreage and two-thirds was the 
result of higher productivity. Banana prices are volatile but have displayed 
an upward trend over the past 10 years, from a low of 263USD/t in 2003 to 
around 925USD/t in late 2013.53 India is by far the largest producer, responsible 
for 24% of global production, followed by China, the Philippines and Ecuador. 
The export market is dominated by Latin America. Ecuador, Guatemala and 
Colombia are large exporting countries. Of the top 10 producers, three are 
members of the ACP group of countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), 
although these do not export significant quantities. India and China also 
consume most of their production domestically. It remains to be seen how 
the current outbreak of Panama disease (a fusarium disease) will affect the 
configuration of exporting countries. The predominant Cavendish variety that 
dominates world trade has been heavily affected.
Over 80% of bananas are consumed in producing countries; the remainder 
is exported. The export market is a highly integrated one, both horizontally 
as well as vertically. Four companies, Chiquita, Fyffes, Dole and Del Monte 
dominate the export market and are estimated to be responsible for 52% of 
global exports.ix Certification, as with other tropical commodities, is geared 
towards export markets. Approximately 14% of global banana exports are 
certified. As a share of total banana production, this figure barely reached 3% 
in 2012. However, the volume of certified production has seen some growth 
over the past few years (Figure 27).54
ix At the time of writing, Chiquita and Fyffes had announced a merger, which was still to be 
approved by shareholders and the Irish High Court. The deal was expected to be finalised by 
the end of 2014.
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Figure 27: Total annual banana supply from 2008 to 2012 split by conventional and certified 
production in million t.  
Sources:55
Three certification schemes dominate the market for certified bananas: 
Rainforest Alliance, Organic and Fairtrade (Figure 28). Certification of 
bananas under GLOBALG.A.P.  also occurs, but this constitutes a very small 
share of production. 
The global picture glosses over marked differences between national sectors. 
The Dominican Republic for example is a substantial Fairtrade supplier. 
Around 13% of its 870,000 t of production in 2012 was Fairtrade certified, 
accounting for around a third of its exports. Organic certification is more 
prevalent still, with 53% of exports to the EU being certified. 
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Figure 28: Supply of certified by bananas from 2008 to 2012 by certificate in million t. 
Sources:56
Rainforest Alliance is by far the largest certifier and has been active since 
the early 1990s when it partnered with Chiquita to certify its plantations and 
its external suppliers. Today, 100% of Chiquita plantations are certified by the 
Rainforest Alliance. Rainforest Alliance appears to have seen strong growth 
but this may be more a recovery as in 2006 it already was responsible for 
over 2 million t of certified bananas. Data on the intervening years is not 
available.57 In 2010 there were lower quantities certified than in 2006. The 
years 2011 and 2012 appear to represent a recovery. Dole relies on Organic, 
Rainforest Alliance and GLOBALG.A.P.  but does not indicate what share of 
its production is certified, nor what the company’s targets are. Del Monte 
states that it promotes more efficient farming and the use of integrated 
pest management (IPM) as a means to reduce pesticide use. The company 
does not make use of the above-mentioned certification schemes. Fyffes 
indicates that it relies on the Ethical Trade Initiative, Fairtrade and Organic. 
The company handled 57 million boxes in 2012, but does not indicate what 
share of its business complies with each standard. Future targets are not 
provided. Witnessing the limited growth of both Fairtrade and Organic from 
2008 to 2012, we suggest that Dole or Fyffes do not have ambitious targets 
on certifying supply. This is underscored by the marketability rate for Fairtrade 
and Organic which fluctuates little (Figure 29).
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The announced merger of Chiquita and Fyffes could have a major effect 
on the landscape of certified bananas. This will depend on whether the 
two prospective partners each keep their own strategy or if a combined 
sustainable sourcing policy is put in place. Of the two, Chiquita is the most 
ambitious where it comes to certification, fully integrating it into all its field 
operations, while Fyffes appears to be more driven by corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) considerations. If the Chiquita model is applied across 
the new entity, then Rainforest Alliance certified banana supply would stand 
to gain. It remains to be seen whether retailers are keen to increase sales of 
Rainforest Alliance certified bananas. Premium payments for Fairtrade are 
reported to be under some pressure in, for example, the UK, where chains 
such as Sainsbury’s are using bananas as a loss leader.x
Figure 29: Average annual marketability rate of certified bananas. 
Source:58
The marketability rate for Rainforest Alliance is 1.0 or close to 1.0. Chiquita 
apparently manages to sell virtually all of its certified supply in certified 
markets.
x A loss leader is a pricing strategy where a product is sold at a price below its market cost to 
stimulate sales of other more profitable goods or services.
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In absolute terms, supply of Rainforest Alliance certified bananas is about 
four times larger than that of Fairtrade, whereas the volume sold as certified is 
over five times higher (Figure 30).
Figure 30: Supply and demand of certified bananas in million t by certificate for 2012 (data on 
Organic from 2011).  
Sources:59
Small-scale producers are an important source of bananas, but the 
export market where certification plays a role is supplied primarily by 
large plantations, many of which either belong to or supply the same 
companies that trade bananas. As such, effects of banana certification of 
small-scale farmers will be limited, but effects on workers of plantations are 
more frequently documented. Notable exceptions are several Caribbean 
producers, such as the Dominican Republic and the Windward Islands, where 
small-scale producers dominate both production and export. Section 7.3 
provides a review of the scientific literature on the effects of certification on 
small-scale farmers in banana production and, more generally, in fruit and 
vegetable production.
7.2  Market and sector -  Vegetables
Global production of vegetables has grown on average 3% annually 
from 2005 to 2012 from 899 million t to 1.1 billion t. Growth in production is 
attributable to expansion of acreage (by 1.6% over the same period) and 
productivity (by 1.4%). The market share of China is, according to FAO, a 
staggering 52% of production on 42% of the global acreage devoted to 
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vegetable production, with India in second place with a share of 9.8%.60 
Actual production volumes are probably understated as an unknown share 
of production never reaches the market, for various reasons.
Global supply of certified vegetable production has probably seen moderate 
growth of 2.1%  per annum since 2007. This figure does not include data on 
GLOBALG.A.P.  which is not publically disclosed by that organisation. The 
share of certified production, excluding GLOBALG.A.P.  is 0.43% as measured 
by the share of acreage used for vegetable production (Figure 31).
If data on GLOBALG.A.P.  were to be included, the share of certified acreage 
would probably be somewhat higher. In 2012, a total of 123,115 producers 
were certified under GLOBALG.A.P., the majority coming from Europe (74%), 
with smaller shares from Latin America (11%), Asia (8%), Africa (5%) and 
Oceania (1%). Forty-nine European retailers, with many national market 
leaders among them, rely on GLOBALG.A.P.  to certify some or all of their 
vegetable suppliers. Imports of fresh and processed vegetables in the EU 
in 2012 totalled 12.4 million t, which is around 1.1% of global production. 
EU production in 2012 was 5.7% of global production. In the EU 75% of 
vegetables are sold via supermarkets. While GLOBALG.A.P.  certification is 
not a legal requirement to access the EU market, access to supermarkets is 
reportedly virtually impossible without it. This then would result in an estimated 
upper limit of 5% of global vegetable production being GLOBALG.A.P. 
certified. The real figure is likely to be somewhere between 1% and 5%. The 
share of acreage will be several orders of magnitude smaller as the majority 
of GLOBALG.A.P.  certified producers are located in countries with high 
productivity. 
In the absence of reliable data on GLOBALG.A.P., Organic production is 
leading the league tables (Figure 31).
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Figure 31: Vegetable production acreage certified from 2007 to 2011 by certification scheme. 
Source:61
Of the acreage under Organic, around 75% is located in the EU and the USA. 
Latin America is the third largest producer, with 16% of the certified acreage. 
Africa, Asia and Oceania have 3%, 4% and 0.5% under management 
respectively. Rainforest Alliance in 2011 certified 2,948 ha of vegetables, a 
tiny share of certified production. The acreage certified under Fairtrade is 
not publically disclosed, but its total certified volume of vegetables in 2012 
amounted to 364 t, a decrease of 23% compared to the previous year.
7.3  benefits for small-scale fruit and vegetable 
producers
We found 41 papers, studies and reports that mention the effects of 
certification programmes on small-scale fruit producers. 
Table 20 in Appendix 3 gives an overview of the number of studies found. 
Furthermore, we found 25 studies that mention the effects of certification 
programmes on small-scale vegetable producers (Table 21 in Appendix 3).
We found only two studies on which we can base a reliable judgement 
of the effects of fruit and vegetable certification. Both studies relate to 
GLOBALG.A.P.  certification of fruit and vegetable producers in Thailand.62
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Twenty-one of the studies on fruit certification include relevant quantitative 
information but lack a credible mechanism by which to identify causality 
of effects. Ten cover Organic certification, seven cover GLOBALG.A.P. 
certification and three cover Fairtrade certification. Some studies include 
information on two or three types of certification; these are counted as 
separate studies (Table 20). Countries and areas that are covered in the 21 
studies on fruit certification considered in this report are: Ghana (6 studies), 
Peru (2), Ecuador, Chile, Costa Rica, Uganda, Madagascar, Brazil, Kenya, 
Bolivia, Thailand, China, and East Africa.
Eight studies on vegetable certification include relevant quantitative 
information but cannot be used to credibly attribute the impacts found 
to the certification programme. Five of these studies cover GLOBALG.A.P. 
certification and three cover Organic certification. We did not find any study 
on Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance vegetable certification. Countries and 
areas that are covered in the 10 studies of which results are presented in this 
report are: Kenya (3), Thailand (3), China, Brazil, Senegal, and East Africa. 
We grouped impact study results in the following impact areas: agronomy, 
economy, services and social effects.
7.3.1  Agronomy
Here we have only found credible evidence for the indicator ‘productivity’; 
the effects of certification on farming efficiency, quality and environmental 
effects were not assessed in the studies. Overall, productivity did not change 
because of GLOBALG.A.P.  certification in Thai fruit and vegetable production. 
However, differences were found between producer-managed certification 
groups and exporter-managed certification groups. In the former group, 
productivity decreased, while in the latter productivity stayed the same as it 
was before certification. 
7.3.2  Economy
The study in Thailand looked at the effects of GLOBALG.A.P.  on fruit and 
vegetable producers by comparing a producer-managed group and a 
certified group managed by an exporter. For the producer-managed group, 
price increases offset productivity decreases, leading to neutral effects on 
income. For the exporter-managed group, there was no price difference and 
the productivity increase was not large enough to improve income from fruit 
and vegetable production. No price premiums were paid to the farmers as 
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exporters used such premiums to cover their GLOBALG.A.P.  compliance costs. 
Whether their costs were covered in full by the premium payment is unclear.
GLOBALG.A.P.  did not have any effect on production costs, but it did improve 
market access; certified producers sold a higher share of their produce to 
high-value markets than non-certified producers. Organisational differences 
between the certified groups was important; prices and market access 
improved for producer-managed certification groups, while they remained 
the same for exporter-managed groups. This was because the latter group 
already had a contract with their exporter (main buyer) before the group 
became certified, while the producer-managed groups entered into new 
business relationships, including contracts, because of the certification 
scheme.
7.3.3  Social effects and services
No information was found in the studies on social effects or effects on service 
delivery of GLOBALG.A.P.  certification. 
7.4  Findings from other impact-related studies - 
Fruit
Of the 21 studies from which information can be used to indicate a possible 
impact of certification on small-scale fruit producers, eight cover Organic 
certification, five cover GLOBALG.A.P.  certification, two studies include 
information on Organic and GLOBALG.A.P.  certification, five studies show 
results for Fairtrade certification and one study for Rainforest Alliance 
certification. 
The studies show mixed results for indicators in the agronomic and economic 
categories. The productivity of Organic certified farmers tends to decrease 
but can also remain the same with certification, while two studies show 
productivity increases for GLOBALG.A.P.  certified farmers. 
Organic farming may have a positive effect on average production costs 
per farmer. Productivity usually decreases. But Organic certified farmers 
(who are sometimes also GLOBALG.A.P.  certified) tend to receive higher 
prices than non-certified farmers, translating into farmers receiving higher 
incomes. In one study, GLOBALG.A.P.  certified farmers received lower prices 
than conventional farmers. Information on developments in farm incomes 
is mixed; incomes can either increase or stay the same, regardless of which 
certification scheme is applied. 
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GLOBALG.A.P., Fairtrade and Organic certified farmers tend to have better 
access to credit and training than non-certified farmers. Fairtrade is found 
to have a neutral effect on organisational development in two-thirds of the 
cases and a positive effect in one-third of cases.
Finally, positive environmental effects were found for Fairtrade, Rainforest 
Alliance and GLOBALG.A.P.  certified farmers and there is an indication of 
certification systems having a positive influence on health (through less use of 
pesticides) and social effects (on gender issues).  
Several of the studies mention that the certification scheme did not 
necessarily lead to the results that were achieved. In addition to  certification, 
delivery and off-take contracts were signed between certified farmers 
and traders. Conventional farmers did not enter into such contracts with 
their buyers. This was the case for GLOBALG.A.P., Fairtrade and Organic 
certification. One study mentions that contract farming and the longer 
term relationship between farmers and buyers that contracting brings were 
responsible for the observed impact. The activities of the buyers and how 
they selected farmers to work with, had an influence on the results, especially 
for GLOBALG.A.P.  certification and for Fairtrade. Farmers who take part in 
such certification schemes tend to have a higher capital stock, are more 
experienced in fruit production and specialise in one product, leading to 
higher productivity compared to non-certified farmers. Certified farmers are 
often located closer to the buyer’s warehouse. Therefore, there is a clear 
selection bias regarding farmers involved in the certification schemes, which 
has probably influenced the results found. 
7.5  Findings from other impact-related studies – 
Vegetables
Of the eight studies on vegetable certification found, five cover GLOBALG.A.P. 
certification and three cover Organic certification. We did not find any 
studies on Fairtrade or Rainforest Alliance vegetable certification.   
GLOBALG.A.P.  certified producers tend to increase their income, because 
of a decrease in production costs, an increase in the price received for their 
produce, or both. Organic certified production could increase farmer income 
because of productivity and price increases, but production cost increases 
can offset an increase in price, which was  the case in one study. 
No information was found in the studies on social effects or effects on service 
delivery of GLOBALG.A.P.  or Organic certification. 
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Contracts play an important role in achieving the impacts found, as 
does direct procurement by buyers from producer groups, in line with the 
information we found on the impact of fruit certification on prices and 
incomes. This applies to both GLOBALG.A.P.  and Organic certification. 
Furthermore, the studies found that certified GLOBALG.A.P.  producers are 
different from non-certified producers with regard to: age, education level, 
size of the farms, assets, wealth, labour availability, access to services, agro-
ecological zone and farm location, amongst others. Such differences have 
probably contributed to the positive impacts of GLOBALG.A.P.  certification 
that were found.
7.6  Cost-benefit analysis of fruit certi f ication
In the fruit sector, a total of 14 reports make reference to implementation 
costs and, again, we have received information on costs through personal 
communication. GLOBALG.A.P.  and Organic certification are best 
covered by the existing literature, while Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance 
certification stand out as the least well-studied certification system in terms of 
implementation costs (Table 22 in Appendix 3). Information on costs from 11 
studies could be used for our analyses; information in the other three studies 
was not specific enough to be used. 
Table 23 (Appendix 3) shows a wide range of values for upfront investment 
costs at farm level. Upfront costs for GLOBALG.A.P.  certification average 
€ 582 per farmer for certificate-holders and ranges between € 42 and 407 per 
farmer at farm level. 
Data on recurring costs is available in more detail than information on upfront 
investment (Table 24, Appendix 3). Recurring costs range between € 104 
and 561 per farmer for certificate-holders and between € 0.61 and 2,605 per 
farmer at farmer level. The high total costs at farm level is explained by high 
costs incurred for external audits and the operation of the internal control or 
management system in a project with a large budget but few farmers, and 
is not representative of all GLOBALG.A.P.  certification programmes. In our 
opinion the extremely low total costs at farm level (€ 0.61 per farmer) are not 
realistic; this figure comes from a study in which only a total for certification is 
stated without explaining what this total cost entails. 
Apart from bananas, no information on the marketability rate for certified 
fruits is available from the literature. We have assumed that the average 
marketability rate is 80%. Investments are made for and by each farmer, and 
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are not related to the volume he produces. Potential earnings are made on the 
volume of certified produce sold. As with other crops, the volume per farmer is 
a critical factor when determining whether or not to invest in certification. If we 
consider just financial aspects we must assume that if we take an average total 
certification or quality premium of € 82 per t at farm level, this translates into € 66 
per t fruit in premium received after adjustment for the marketability rate. A 
second assumption is that the upfront costs of € 41.76 to 407.26 are amortised 
over eight years. The amortisation period is five years longer than what is used 
for other commodities. We justify this by noting that GLOBALG.A.P.  requires 
more investment in durable assets, such as storage facilities. Finally, we have 
taken out a number of outliers (both extremely high and extremely low values 
per farmer) from our financial analysis. With these figures, we have plotted a 
graph that shows at what production levels per farmer certification could be 
financially viable when combining certification costs of both certificate-holders 
and farmers (Figure 32).
Figure 32: Revenue scenarios at minimum cost per farmer (€ 15) and maximum cost per 
farmer (€ 192) at farmer level. Marketability is set at 80%, an assumed rate as no information is 
available in the literature. The average premium is assumed to be € 82 per t at farm level. Upfront 
costs are amortised over eight years.
Figure 32 shows that to be financially viable at farm level, the average 
production per farmer must be between 0.22 t and 2.94 t of fruit, depending 
on the implementation costs. As no information was available on premiums 
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for certificate-holders, we have been unable to conduct similar analyses 
at certificate-holder level or the combined farmer and certificate-holder 
situation. 
The required production volume per farmer to achieve break-even has 
implications for origins where production per farmer is below these figures, 
and could be especially problematic for the financial situation with maximum 
costs, requiring at least 2.94 t per farmer.
7.7  Cost-benefit analysis of vegetable certi f ication
For the vegetable sector, a total of 16 studies report on implementation costs. 
GLOBALG.A.P.  is best covered by the existing literature, and Fairtrade and 
Rainforest Alliance certification less so (Table 24, Appendix 3). Information on 
costs from eight studies was used for our analyses. 
Table 26, Appendix 3, shows a wide range of values for cost accrued by the 
farmer and certificate-holder. Upfront costs for GLOBALG.A.P.  certification 
range from € 15.31 to 7,707 per farmer for certificate-holders and from € 313 
to 704 per farmer at farmer level. Data on recurring costs is available in less 
detail than information on upfront investment (Table 27, Appendix 3). Such 
costs range between € 9 and 2,511 per farmer for certificate-holders and 
between € 16 and 221 per farmer at farmer level. 
The extremely high total costs for certificate-holders are explained by high 
costs incurred for infrastructure, and by the operation of the internal control or 
management system in a single project with a large budget, but few farmers. 
We suspect such high recurring costs are not representative of all GLOBALG.A.P. 
certification programmes but we cannot corroborate this with data.
No information on the marketability rate for certified vegetables is available 
from the literature. We have assumed that the average marketability rate 
is 80%. The cost of implementation is a function of the number of farmers 
in a certified group and, more so than for non-perishable products, the 
production per farmer. More productive vegetable farmers are likely to need 
greater storage and cooling capacity, which is more costly. On the basis of 
literature findings we have not been able to ascertain how the investment 
level correlates with production capacity. Additional earnings are made 
on the volume of certified produce sold. The volume per farmer and his 
production level are critical factors when determining whether or not to 
invest in certification. 
78 C O S T S  A N D  B E N E F I T S  O F  C E R T I F I C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
Premiums in vegetable production are mostly disbursed for better quality 
and are often associated with having access to export markets. We take 
the average total certification premium or price differential that results from 
being able to sell in export markets as € 21 per t at farm level. We suspect the 
number can vary significantly between products and markets but have not 
found reliable data to back this up. A second assumption is that the upfront 
investments that farmers make of € 15 to 703 can be amortised over eight 
years. We use a longer amortisation period for vegetables than for the other 
commodities, as infrastructure costs are high and relate to buildings. Based 
on these figures, we plotted a line that shows at what production level per 
farmer certification becomes financially viable, for farmers only (Figure 33).
Figure 33: Revenue scenarios at minimum cost per farmer (€ 55) and maximum cost per 
farmer (€ 309) at farmer level. Marketability is set at 80%, an assumed rate as no information 
is available in the literature.  The average premium is assumed to be € 21 per t at farm level 
which is calculated based on price differences between conventional and GLOBALG.A.P. 
certified vegetables. Upfront costs are amortised over eight years.
Figure 33 shows that to be financially viable at farm level, average 
production needs to be in the range of 3.30 t to 18.43 t vegetables per 
farmer, depending on the level of implementation costs. As no information 
was available on premiums for certificate-holders, we have been unable 
to conduct similar analyses at certificate-holder level, or for farmers and 
certificate-holders combined. 
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We found several contextual factors that influence certification costs or 
benefits in the literature and through contact with organisations working on 
the implementation of certification programmes.
8.1  Factors influencing certi f ication costs
The volume produced per farmer influences the cost-benefit ratio for 
farmers and certificate-holders 
Premiums are calculated and paid out on a volume basis. When farmers 
produce low volumes of a certain commodity, such premiums are spread 
over a large number of farmers, reducing the premiums paid per farmer. 
Certification is more lucrative for farmers who produce high volumes. The 
same applies to certificate-holders; working with farmers who produce high 
volumes is the most lucrative.
The starting situation of farmers prior to certification influences 
implementation costs
The road to complying with a code of conduct depends on the starting 
situation of a farmer. If farmers already adhere to much of the code’s 
requirements before participating in a certification programme, the 
implementation costs of such programmes are likely to be lower, as training 
efforts and upfront investments can be reduced. Conversely, if farmers have 
to adapt their practices significantly, then increased training efforts and/or 
upfront investments are needed, increasing implementation costs. 
Organisational presence in an area and the availability of trainers 
facilitates the implementation of programmes, reducing costs
The presence of NGOs, government organisations or other actors already 
active in extension or other certification-related activities will facilitate the 
implementation of certification programmes, reducing costs. Having to build 
up new partnerships between organisations and new relationships with 
8 Contextual factors 
influencing certification costs and benefits
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farmers will result in less efficient programme implementation and increased 
implementation costs. 
The larger the scale of a programme, the lower the costs per farmer
We found that certification costs can differ greatly. Often, this is because 
some projects include hundreds of farmers, while others include thousands, 
or tens of thousands. Generally speaking, the greater the number of farmers 
included in a certification programme, the lower the implementation cost 
will be per farmer, because of economies of scale. 
The more farmers are already organised in producer groups, and the 
better the organisational capacities of such groups, the lower the 
certification costs
Usually, farmer groups or organisations are established to decrease the 
cost of implementation per (small-scale) farmer, and increase programme 
efficiency. The existence of well-managed farmer organisations can facilitate 
the implementation of certification programmes. Such groups can either 
act as certificate-holders or can take greater responsibility in running 
aspects of implementation such as carrying out internal audits or making 
yield assessments. As their labour unit costs tend to be lower than those of 
exporters or other professionals, their implementation costs can be reduced. 
Harmonisation of standards and combined audits reduces certification 
costs
Some farmers become certified under different certification schemes, 
which may overlap in their requirements. Audits and training programmes 
are generally implemented separately for different certification schemes. 
Overlapping schemes may lead to unnecessary costs for farmers and 
certificate-holders. 
Access to donor funding improves the business case for certification
Certification may not be financially beneficial for certificate-holders at the 
start of a certification programme. The upfront investment costs may be too 
high for farmers or certificate-holders, or the payback time too long. Donor 
funding of certification programmes can improve the business case for 
certification; access to such funding may be crucial to set up certification 
programmes where the business case would otherwise be negative, at least 
during start-up. In several projects where donor funding is available there is 
a tendency to have higher costs per farmer. This could be because farmers 
may receive more extensive support than they would otherwise get.
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8.2  Factors influencing certi f ication benefits
Commitment from buyers influences marketability rates and the business 
case for certification
The business case for certification improves with an increasing marketability 
rate. Investments in certification only start to pay off after a few seasons, while 
off-take agreements with buyers do not normally run beyond the duration of 
a single season. Longer term commitments from buyers to source a minimum 
volume of certified produce against a premium over a 3 to 5 year period can 
greatly help to improve the willingness of exporters or farmer organisations to 
invest in certification. 
Well-implemented technical assistance enhances the potential for 
benefits 
There can be large differences in how technical assistance is provided to 
farmers, ranging from biannual meetings for large groups of farmers to small 
learning groups, with about 30 farmers who meet every two weeks, and 
between professionals who implement the training. Training programmes 
should be adjusted to farmers’ training needs; some farmers need more 
training than others to comply with code requirements. Learning from 
other farmers can sometimes be as effective as learning from professional 
teachers. But in certification programmes where training of farmers is 
a first step in obtaining a certificate, the way training programmes are 
implemented is instrumental in changing farm management practices and 
achieving impact. 
Farmers may benefit more from contracts and direct procurement than 
from certification
In several studies on the impact of cocoa, cotton, fruit and vegetable 
certification, the beneficial impacts of certification are highlighted. 
The impacts were derived from supply contracts between farmers and 
buyers that were introduced as part of the certification programme. Such 
contracts may influence product quality because they specify minimum 
quality requirements. Farmers who attain such requirements receive 
premiums or higher prices, although their production costs could also be 
higher. Sometimes, contracts also specify higher prices in general in return 
for guarantee of supply. Contracts were also found in which the farmer 
was offered technical assistance, credit and inputs, which is likely to have 
far greater benefits. Similar impacts were found when buyers had direct 
procurement relationships with producer groups instead of buying from them 
indirectly or through spot markets.
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Income loss due to a conversion period for organic farming
We found several studies on the impacts of Organic certification in which the 
conversion to certified Organic production led to income loss, as a result of 
lower production in the first few years. The positive income effects found may 
only be apparant after several years of Organic certification. Non-certified 
farmers, who are used for purposes of comparison, are often Organic by 
default. Supporting such farmers over a number of years to become Organic 
certified is likely to result in impact. What would be more interesting, but to our 
knowledge not yet been done, would be to make a comparison between 
income from well-managed Organic certified farms and well-managed small-
scale farms that use fertiliser and biocides judiciously. 
benefits differ between certified and non-certified farmers because of 
different farmer characteristics 
Certified and non-certified farmers may differ in their characteristics, 
explaining at least part of the impacts found for certified farmers. This is 
especially the case for GLOBALG.A.P.  certified farmers, who are usually 
selected by exporters and do not represent the average small-scale farmer. 
Certified farmers are generally better educated, have more assets, are more 
specialised or experienced in crop production, have larger farms, have higher 
labour availability, have better access to services and are located closer to 
buyers or in better agro-ecological zones, than non-certified producers. These 
characteristics are likely to have contributed to the positive effects found in 
the impact studies where these pre-existing differences were not taken into 
account. Such effects are therefore unlikely to be easily achieved by average 
farmers with lower skill sets and assets. 
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9.1  Evidence for positive impact from certif ication
In assessing the net results of certification and verification for small-scale 
farmers in the cocoa, coffee, cotton and fruit and vegetable sectors, we 
found 19 out of 270 studies (for all sectors combined) with a methodology 
to construct a credible counter-factual scenario which allows attribution of 
impact to certification. The coffee sector is best covered with 15 such studies 
and a large number of other impact studies. For sectors where certification is 
a more recent phenomenon, the number is much more limited; one in cocoa 
certification, one in cotton and two for both fruit and vegetable certification. 
This makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the impacts of certification on 
small-scale farmer livelihoods in the cotton, cocoa, and horticultural sectors. 
Thus, firm conclusions on the impact of certification can only be drawn for the 
coffee sector.
9.1.1  Coffee
The evidence for a positive impact of coffee certification is limited. Price 
increases occur, especially for Fairtrade certified producers, but productivity 
increases that would further leverage positive price effects have not been 
found, with one exception. The evidence on production costs is mixed, 
with one study finding no effects and two each that identify neutral and 
negative outcomes. No effects on  farming efficiency were found. So, 
despite price increases, effects on income are overwhelmingly neutral, as 
six out of eight studies find no effect and of the other two studies, one is 
positive and the other shows a negative income effect. A more convincing 
positive effect is that certified producers have more access to services, in 
particular training.
9.1.2  Cocoa
In cocoa, a single sufficiently rigorous study indicates that certified Organic 
contract farming schemes positively impact on prices, cocoa revenues and 
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access to training. However, those effects cannot only be attributed to Organic 
certification, as contracting arrangements also played an important role. 
Some indicative impacts of certification were found in the other quantitative 
impact studies under review, but these effects cannot be solely attributed 
to certification because of methodological constraints. There is some 
indication of improved productivity for certified producers, but most studies 
do not find positive impacts on income because of higher production costs 
and low marketability rates. In the cocoa sector most certification schemes 
are part of a much broader set of interventions geared to assist producers 
in improving production. Attributing effects solely to certification, as some 
studies do, is therefore difficult to justify. As none of these studies takes into 
account certification costs at farm level as part of the production cost and 
net income analysis, we conclude that net income effects are likely to be 
either neutral or negative, if all farm-level costs were borne by the producers 
(compared to situations in which donor funding covers part of the costs).
9.1.3  Cotton
No information on impact was found for CMiA or BCI certification. We found 
one study that relies on a credible counter-factual scenario to identify impact 
in cotton certification. This study covered a case of Fairtrade certification 
in Mali. It found that cotton quality increased, leading to farmers receiving 
higher prices for cotton. No analyses were conducted on the impact on 
productivity or income. The quality and price improvements cannot solely be 
attributed to Fairtrade certification, as the authors indicate that the contracts 
between farmers and buyers, introduced by the certificate-holder as part of 
the implementation of the Fairtrade certification programme, contributed to 
the quality and price increases. 
The other 10 impact studies, results of which cannot be attributed to 
certification because of methodological constraints, show that Organic 
certification tends to lead to lower productivity levels. Both Fairtrade and 
Organic cotton fetch a higher price on the market than conventional cotton. 
For the latter, premiums from 5 to 20% are mentioned. Price increases in 
combination with production cost decreases lead two-thirds of the studies to 
conclude that farm income is higher for Organic or Fairtrade certified farmers 
than for non-certified farmers, though Organic farmers experience income 
losses in the first few years after conversion.
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9.1.4  Fruit and vegetables
The only studies that assess what would have happened if a certified farmer 
had not become certified are two studies on GLOBALG.A.P. certification. 
These studies found that farm income did not change because of 
certification, even though prices increased and productivity stayed the same 
or decreased. GLOBALG.A.P.  did not have any effect on production costs, but 
improved market access. Organisational differences between the certified 
groups was significant; prices and market access improved for producer-
managed certification groups, while they stayed the same for exporter-
managed groups. 
Information from other studies on fruit and vegetable certification, of 
which the results cannot be attributed to impact of certification due to 
methodological constraints, indicates that the productivity of Organic 
certified fruit producing farmers may decrease but can also remain the 
same, while productivity increases are found for GLOBALG.A.P.  certified 
farmers. Furthermore, Organic farming may have a positive effect on average 
production costs per farmer. Productivity usually decreases, but higher prices 
received often translate into farmers receiving higher incomes. The evidence 
on income changes as a result of Fairtrade and GLOBALG.A.P.  certification in 
fruit is mixed. GLOBALG.A.P., Fairtrade and Organic certified farmers seem to 
have better access to credit and training, while Fairtrade is sometimes found 
to have a positive effect on organisational development. Finally, Fairtrade, 
Rainforest Alliance and GLOBALG.A.P.  seem to contribute to environmental 
and social improvements.  
Regardless of the certification scheme that is applied, delivery and service 
contracts between certificate-holders and farmers play an important, even 
decisive, role in achieving the impacts found, as does direct procurement by 
buyers from producer groups. This applies to both GLOBALG.A.P.  and Organic 
certification. Furthermore, the studies found that certified GLOBALG.A.P. 
producers are different from non-certified producers, with regard to capacities, 
assets and farm location, amongst others. This has probably resulted in the 
positive impacts of GLOBALG.A.P.  certification found by the research.
9.2  Financial costs and benefits of certi f ication
There is a lack of empirical data on certification costs for small-scale farmers 
and certificate-holders. This is partly because many certification programmes 
are co-funded by donors, leading to programme costs that are not 
transparent. Also, information on costs is often scattered throughout different 
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organisations because of their different roles in certification programmes; 
information is often not collected in a detailed manner. Companies that 
act as certificate-holders tend not to share information on implementation 
costs as this is regarded as competitive information. The studies on costs and 
benefits of certification that have been published usually lack information 
on several cost types, leading to an incomplete picture of total certification 
costs. Other studies base their calculations on assumptions on membership of 
producer organisations, volumes produced per farmer, or premiums received 
by farmers, leading to unrealistic figures on the net benefit of certification 
programmes.
We find little evidence for farm-level improvements resulting from investment 
in certification. Therefore, implementing certification cost effectively requires 
market premiums to cover additional costs incurred by both farmers and 
companies. The cost benefit section shows what should be taken into 
account when deciding to invest in certification. The decisive factors, apart 
from implementation costs, are: production per farmer, premium levels and 
marketability rates. Even with the premiums paid for certified products, the 
economics do not always add up. Implementation costs are a function of the 
number of farmers with whom a company or farmer organisation implements 
a certification programme, whereas benefits in the form of premiums are 
primarily a function of the volume sold. Hence, low volume farmers are 
relatively more costly to certify. 
9.2.1  Coffee
It is no coincidence that by far the majority of certified sustainable coffees, 
whether UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance or 4C, originates from areas with a 
relatively high degree of farmer organisation or high production per farmer, 
such as Central and South America and South-East Asia. The three dominant 
suppliers of certified sustainable coffee are Brazil, Vietnam and Colombia, 
accounting for close to 80% of certified supply in 2012.63
The other commodities display a similar tendency. Depending on the level of 
implementation costs, above average volumes per small-scale farmer need 
to be produced for certification to be cost-neutral or profitable. Information 
on cocoa certification costs confirms this picture. 
9.2.2  Cocoa
Information on certification costs is scarce, but enough to draw some 
conclusions on the break-even point for farmers and certificate-holders.  
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We conclude that certification costs can be recovered from 1.12 to 2.9 t 
of cocoa produced at farm level for the minimum cost and maximum 
cost scenarios. However, these break-even points in reality may require a 
higher production volume, as complete information on certification costs is 
unavailable from the literature. As most cocoa producers in Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire produce less than 3 t of cocoa per year, and many produce around 
1.2 t,64 it will be challenging for cocoa producers and certificate-holders to 
earn back their total certification costs. Donor funding may continue to be 
required to cover certification costs. If this is not available, certificate-holders 
and farmers may end up bearing certification costs that can only be partly 
recovered.
9.2.3  Cotton
With patchy cost information on Fairtrade, Organic and BCI certification in 
cotton, our models show that to be financially viable, average production 
per farmer needs to be in the range of 1.32 t to 4.34 t cotton per farmer. For 
certificate-holders, we find that a volume of 680 kg of lint is sufficient under 
the minimum implementation cost scenario, while close to 4 t is required 
if the maximum cost scenario is applied. The real break-even volume may 
be at a higher production level because information on upfront costs is not 
available. By comparison, productivity in sub-Saharan Africa ranges from 250 
to 450 kg/ha while, on average, farmers have around 2 ha under cotton. In 
most cases, the volumes produced appear to be insufficient to recoup the 
implementation costs. Large amounts of donor funding often make up the 
shortfall.
9.2.4  Fruit and vegetables
We have found the break-even points for GLOBALG.A.P certified fruit and 
vegetables to be very different, because costs for vegetable certification 
found in our research are much higher than for fruit certification, and 
because the premium for vegetables found in the literature is one quarter 
of the premium for fruit. This leads to the conclusion that fruit producers can 
recuperate certification costs with much lower volumes than vegetable 
producers (0.22 to 2.94 t for fruit producers; and 3.30 t to 18.43 t for vegetable 
producers for minimum cost and maximum cost scenarios).  For both 
production systems, the quantities of certified produce that need to be 
produced per farmer to earn back total certification costs may in fact be 
higher than we calculate, as not all certification costs are accounted for in 
the literature. It would be difficult to recover certification costs if donors did 
not contribute to cover them, especially for vegetable producers.
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9.2.5  Conclusion
While sustainability certification is frequently stated to generally assist small-
scale producers, it is the better organised small-scale producers with relatively 
high production who are most likely to reach or surpass break-even on 
certification costs. Company-led implementation of sustainability certification 
seems to  become the predominant model, and strengthens the role of well-
organised multinational corporations in local supply bases. This need not be 
a bad thing. In many African countries, farmers stand to benefit greatly from 
closer association with (multinational) exporting companies. However, even 
for well-funded companies with good access to international credit markets, 
implementing certification cost effectively in countries with low production 
per farmer is likely to remain a challenge and donor funding is likely to remain 
important for field-level implementation.
Donor funding and other grants also cover a significant share of the 
organisational costs of certification organisations. In the absence of 
overwhelming positive evidence at farm level of the benefits to farmers of 
certification, and because of the obvious bias for better-off farmers and the 
relatively high cost per beneficiary at organisation level, one is forced to 
consider whether this funding could have been better spent on other rural 
development activities, particularly those with a greater focus on assisting the 
poor. 
9.3  Factors that influence certi f ication costs and 
benefits
From the benefit perspective, commitment from buyers influences 
marketability rates and therefore affects premiums received for certified 
cocoa. Low marketability rates lead to farmers receiving premiums for only 
a part of the certified crop produced. Earning back certification costs may 
become difficult when other claimed benefits, such as improvements in 
productivity and farming efficiency, do not accrue, or do so only partly. When 
there is no immediate business case for certification at farm level, access to 
donor funding can change the perspective by temporarily covering upfront 
certification costs, or more permanently when donors, or the private sector, 
have a stake in maintaining farmer certification. 
If farmers, especially in the coffee and cocoa sectors, become certified by 
more than one certification scheme, the harmonisation of standards, and 
combined training and audits for various certificates would reduce total 
certification costs. Certification costs are influenced by the starting position of 
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farmers prior to certification; the more farmers who comply with certification 
requirements, the lower the implementation costs can be. In addition, more 
local implementation capacity means costs for capacity building can 
be reduced. Also, the bigger the scale of the programme, the lower the 
certification programme costs per farmer. The degree of farmer organisation 
and organisational capacities also matters; establishing producer 
organisations or enhancing capacities of existing organisations increases 
implementation costs. 
Contracts and direct procurement relationships with buyers influenced 
the impacts found in cocoa, cotton and fruit and vegetable certification 
programmes. Therefore, not only the certification programme matters. In 
fact, tentative evidence points to intensified relations between farmers and 
buyers as being beneficial for both. Under such frameworks farmers may 
receive access to much-needed services and inputs in return for which they 
sell part or all of their crop to the buyer. The buyer’s benefit is enhanced 
supply security and the ability to enforce standards on quality and perhaps 
certification. 
Differences between certified and non-certified farmers that are attributed 
to participation in the certification programme can sometimes also be 
explained by pre-existing differences. Farmers with better capacities, more 
assets and closer proximity to export markets are more likely to be selected 
or to self-select into certification programmes, most probably influencing the 
impacts found. 
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As information on concrete financial costs and benefits for small-scale 
producers is so scarce in the literature, we provide recommendations for 
producers and certificate-holders to help them in deciding whether or not 
to opt for certification. We present recommendations to improve the business 
case for certification, to maximise benefits and minimise costs of certification 
for small-scale farmers. 
10.1  Recommendations for producers and 
certi f icate-holders
When considering whether to become certified, investigate the following 
issues:
1. What would be the potential financial benefits of certification:
a. Is there market demand for certified produce?
b. What would be the percentage of produce that buyers would source 
as certified (the marketability rate)?
c. For how long will buyers consider sourcing certified produce?
d. Will a price premium be paid for certified produce, and for how long 
would such a premium be sustained?
e. Does the relationship with a buyer depend on whether or not 
products are certified?
f. Can a contract be established with a buyer, with or without 
certification requirements, including agreements on prices, quality 
and technical assistance?
2. What would be the expected costs of certification:
a. What would be the cost types that can be expected to occur 
because of certification? 
b. How do local circumstances (producer and organisational 
capacities, availability of trainers and organisational support) 
influence expected certification costs? 
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c. Can upfront investment costs be borne? And by whom?
d. Is donor funding, or other funding external to the value chain, 
available to cover (part) of the upfront or recurring certification costs. 
What would happen when donor funding stops?
3. Which factors would influence the business case for certification:
a. How much do farmers produce on average?
b. What would happen to the business case for certification if market 
prices would increase or drop in the future?
c. What do you consider to be a reasonable payback time for investing 
in becoming certified?
Based on the information acquired on these issues, a conclusion can be 
drawn concerning the expected net benefit of certification and whether or 
not to opt for certification. 
10.2  Recommendations to improve the business 
case for certi f ication and the impact for 
small-scale farmers
The scarcity of information on costs and benefits of certification also leads us 
to recommend the following:
1. Certification organisations should improve the transparency on costs and 
benefits of certification. Based on more insights into the net benefits of 
certification, farmers, certificate-holders and the private sector would be 
better able to decide whether or not to opt for certification. In addition, 
donors could use the information to decide whether or not to invest in 
certification programmes. 
2. For prospective certificate-holders it would be beneficial to have access 
to high quality market data for the different certificates. Only 4C, UTZ 
Certified and BCI are transparent on aggregate production and demand 
figures. All certification schemes could improve matters further by making 
available country-level supply and demand intelligence to the general 
public and prospective certificate-holders and producers. 
3. Implementation costs of certification could be reduced by loosening 
requirements for certificate-holders that have shown consistently good 
performance over a certain period. These could be rewarded with a 
lower frequency of audits, for example, or customised codes of conduct 
that only target those issues that are known to be relevant in their 
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situation. Or they could be allowed to make intelligent, desk-based yield 
predictions for certified producers.
4. Compare the costs and benefits of certification programmes with the 
costs and benefits of other supply chain interventions such as different 
kinds of service-delivery programmes or contract-farming schemes. 
Certification is not the only tool available that could improve small-scale 
farmer livelihoods. Other types of interventions, such as the provision of 
training, inputs, credit or insurance, are gaining in importance (often 
in association with certification programmes), and it would be helpful 
if the impacts of the different interventions could be compared, so 
farmers, their organisations, companies and donors could make informed 
decisions on which interventions to invest in.
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In some markets, such as coffee and cocoa, certified sustainable products 
are on track to become mainstream. The general expectation is that as 
certification becomes mainstream, premium payments will erode. At the 
same time, producing certified products may become essential for entry into 
certain markets. 
Based on our experience of the implementation of certification systems, we 
foresee the following future developments of (sustainability) certification.
1. Certificate-holders will cease to be certified because certification costs 
cannot be recovered.
2. Producers or certificate-holders bear the costs of certification if 
certification becomes an essential requirement to export to certain 
markets and premiums disappear.
3. Alternative certification systems are created to decrease certification 
costs.
4. Certification becomes the standard. To keep differentiating themselves 
from other standards and by demand from manufacturers and retailers, 
certification schemes add more and more requirements on top of what 
already exist.
Certificate-holders will cease to be certified because certification costs 
cannot be recovered
Against the background of often ambitious targets for the procurement 
of certified volumes by manufacturers in certain commodity sectors, a 
widespread abandonment of certification by certificate-holders and 
producers in these sectors is unlikely. Coffee, cocoa and bananas are good 
examples where this is unlikely to happen on a large scale. Still, certain 
11 Future outlook  – 
four scenarios for future developments around certification
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groups of producers might cease to be certified. Likely candidates for this 
are smaller producer groups that have relied heavily on donor funding 
to become certified, but discover the true costs of compliance after that 
funding ceases to be available. Marketability rates will play an important 
role in such decisions. Anecdotal evidence from the coffee sector, backed 
to some degree by our break-even analysis, shows that certificate-
holders that manage to sell around 50% of certified volume as such, tend 
to have financially viable certified operations. The likelihood of failure to 
maintain certification due to poor marketability is probably greater where 
implementation was driven primarily by an NGO or development agenda 
rather than by concrete market demand.
Moving out of certification can also occur because other market 
opportunities that show better cost-benefit ratios present themselves. For 
some groups of producer and certificate-holders, especially those in higher 
quality market segments, more money is made by focussing on intrinsic 
product quality rather than on certification. Others may discover market 
opportunities that offer perhaps lower prices, but are less demanding and 
therefore show better cost-benefit ratios. Increasing demand from emerging 
markets where growth in spending power outstrips demand for certified 
products will likely present such opportunities. Anecdotal evidence suggests, 
for example, that certain cashew producers are already eagerly selling 
to the Indian market. Prices may be a bit lower, but India does not require 
certification, as Europe does. 
Certification becomes an essential requirement to export to certain 
markets and producers or certificate-holders bear the costs of 
certification as premiums disappear
Certification may become a license to export into certain markets  when 
certified produce has become mainstream in these markets. When something 
becomes the de facto standard, there ceases to be a reason to pay a 
premium for such a product. Yet producing certified products will continue 
to require some investment relative to business as before. It could be that 
as the premium disappears, the old market price plus the premium value 
becomes the new normal price. This would effectively internalise the cost of 
certification into the product price. Certificate-holders and producers would 
bear the cost of certification, but would be none the worse for it. In Vietnam, 
in the case of coffee, this seems to happening in those provinces where 
certification constitutes a majority of supply. Farmers are not willing to sell at 
normal prices anymore but have been demanding price plus a premium for 
any coffee and they believe they can afford to wait until they get it. Whether 
this is an anomaly or whether it will continue in the future is not yet clear. 
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The alternative is that if no price increase occurs, the premium disappears, 
and the certification costs are borne by the certificate-holders. This is a more 
likely scenario, especially in markets where a few large manufacturers or 
retailers represent a large share of demand. The developments in GlobalG.A.P. 
followed such a trajectory, initially among European vegetable producers. In 
competitive national markets with plenty of opportunities for farmers to sell 
into conventional channels, it will probably be the certificate-holders that 
bear the brunt of this development. Where this is not the case, the certificate-
holder will have incentives to try to pass on the compliance cost to farmers, 
exerting downward pressure on the farm-gate price.
Alternative certification systems are created to decrease certification 
costs
Certification costs may become too high for certificate-holders. Instead of 
discontinuing certification, they may try to develop their own competing 
standards that are more easily and cheaply implemented. According to 
several Fairtrade proponents, this is already happening by the favouring 
of UTZ Certified, Rainforest Alliance and others over Fairtrade and Organic. 
Of course, the owners of the newly popular standards deny that they are 
less stringent. Among some of the larger exporting companies that act 
as certificate-holder for tens or even hundreds of thousands of farmers, 
potentially far-reaching plans to develop lower cost alternatives to 
certification than with the current labels are under discussion. None that we 
know has entered the market yet. And until they do, it remains to be seen 
if manufacturers are willing to shift some of their reputational risk insurance 
from certification schemes to product suppliers and if campaigning NGOs will 
allow them do so. 
Certification becomes the standard. To keep differentiating themselves 
from other standards and by demand from manufacturers and retailers, 
certification schemes add more and more requirements on top of what 
already exists
If certification becomes a license to export to developed markets and 
exists as the de facto standard, it is likely that certification agencies will try 
to keep distinguishing themselves from their competitors. After all, many 
of the standards are by now businesses in their own right and they need 
to distinguish themselves and continue to satisfy their clients in order to 
survive. Rainforest Alliance, UTZ and 4C all have climate change modules 
to add to their code or are developing them. A 2013 ‘gender in cocoa’ 
campaign by Oxfam led to a scrambling among manufacturers to show 
that they ‘do something’ about it. In many cases ‘doing something’ entails 
asking the owner of the standard(s) they use to show what they do about 
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it. As a result, certification agencies are likely to add compliance points or 
data requirements on gender issues, as well as on other issues that emerge. 
It is unclear who will pay the cost of compliance; any of the previous three 
scenarios could apply. Certification agencies may try to introduce their 
standards to the consumer as part of emerging markets.
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Organisations contacted for information for this study
Appendix 1 
Commodity Type of organisation Organisation
Cocoa, coffee Company Unilever
Cocoa, coffee NGO Rainforest Alliance
Cocoa, coffee NGO/Company UTZ Certified
Cocoa, coffee, cotton Company OLAM
Cocoa, coffee, cotton NGO SUSTAINEO
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
NGO Fairtrade / Max Havelaar /FLO
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
NGO COSA
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
Research institute CIRAD
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
NGO IDH
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
Research institute Wageningen UR
Cocoa, coffee, cotton, fruit & 
vegetables
NGO IMO Fair For Life
Cocoa, coffee, fruit & vegetables NGO Solidaridad
Coffee, fruit & vegetables Company Michiel Schoenmakers




Cotton Company Sustainable Organic Farm Systems
Cotton Company Brownstone Consulting
Cotton Company New Equilibrium
Cocoa NGO Agro-Eco Louis Bolk Institute
Fruit & vegetables Company React Africa
Fruit & vegetables NGO COLEACP
Fruit & vegetables NGO GLOBALG.A.P.
Fruit & vegetables Research institute Georg-August-University Göttingen
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Certificate History Target group Governance
4C Association Established in 2003 as 
a project of GTZ and 
DKV, aiming to address 
effects of coffee 
crisis. Developed into 
certification scheme in 
2006.
Farmers and workers. General assembly of 
members elects governing 
council.
BCI Established in 2009 by 4 
private sector founding 
members.
Farmers, large and 
small-scale.
General assembly of 
members elects council.
CMiA Established in 2005 by 




Decisions made by Aid by 
Trade Foundation board of 
trustees.
Fairtrade Founded in 1988 by the 
NGO Solidaridad under 
the name Max Havelaar. 
Small-scale farmers 
who are members of a 
farmer-led organisation. 
Large plantation in 
some products but not 
in others.
General assembly of 
members approve board of 
directors.
Global Gap Established in 1997 as 
Eurepgap by retailers.
Companies, farmers. Fully-owned by FoodPlus 
GmbH. Governed by Board 
of producers and retailers 
who report to members 
and FoodPlus shareholders. 
FoodPlus in turn is held by the 
ETI Retail Institute which is in 
turn owned by 550 members 
of the retail industry.
Information on certi f ication systems
Appendix 2 
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Certificate History Target group Governance
4C Association Established in 2003 as 
a project of GTZ and 
DKV, aiming to address 
effects of coffee 
crisis. Developed into 
certification scheme in 
2006.
Farmers and workers. General assembly of 
members elects governing 
council.
BCI Established in 2009 by 4 
private sector founding 
members.
Farmers, large and 
small-scale.
General assembly of 
members elects council.
CMiA Established in 2005 by 




Decisions made by Aid by 
Trade Foundation board of 
trustees.
Fairtrade Founded in 1988 by the 
NGO Solidaridad under 
the name Max Havelaar. 
Small-scale farmers 
who are members of a 
farmer-led organisation. 
Large plantation in 
some products but not 
in others.
General assembly of 
members approve board of 
directors.
Global Gap Established in 1997 as 
Eurepgap by retailers.
Companies, farmers. Fully-owned by FoodPlus 
GmbH. Governed by Board 
of producers and retailers 
who report to members 
and FoodPlus shareholders. 
FoodPlus in turn is held by the 
ETI Retail Institute which is in 
turn owned by 550 members 
of the retail industry.
Audit model business model 
(values in Euros)
Price premiums Claimed producer 
benefits
Initial verification by one 
of 21 4C approved  third 
party auditors, annual 
self-inspection and third-
party re-verification 
every 3 years. Audit paid 
by certificate-holder.
Annual budget 
around € 1.8 million. 
Membership fees from 
all actors, including 
farmers. These cover 
around 88% of 
operational budget 
(2012). 3% donor 
funding.
Not required, but 




- Optimize use of inputs
- Increased income
- Access to information
Annual self-assessment, 
follow-up checks by 
BCI, annual 3rd party 
verification. Audit paid 
for by BCI.
Annual budget € 3.6 
million (2012). Income 
from membership fees 
(26%), services such as 
verification (22%) and 
donor funding (49%).
No price premium. - Reduced costs
- Greater profitability
-  Better farm 
management
- Reduced use of inputs
- Access to finance
3rd audit party by one 
of 2 accredited auditors 
every 2 years. Decision 
for which auditor to use 
lies with CMiA. Audit fees 
paid by Aid by Trade 
Foundation.
No budget information 
found. Membership 
fee, license fee of 2.5% 
on garment price and 
volume fee. Donor 
supported.
No price premium 
to farmer.
- Access to training
- Better yields
-  Better income
Audit every year. Audits 
done exclusively by FLO-
CERT which is owned by 
Fairtrade International. 
Audit cost paid by 
certificate-holder.
Annual budget 
€ 14.97 million (2012). 







-  Stable prices
-  Fairtrade premium
-  Influence on Fairtrade
-  International’s 
strategy
-  Empowerment of 
farmers and workers
Annual 3rd party 




Audit is paid for by 
certificate-holder.




registration fees and 
certification fee 
(farmers).
No premiums. -  No farmer benefits 
listed
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Certificate History Target group Governance
Organic Established by various 
organic schemes in 1972 
as IFOAM. Currently 750 
member organisations. 
Companies, farmers. General Assembly elects 
world board that appoints 
working groups. National and 
supra-national  legislation 







Established in 1986 
(SAN) by eight (Latin) 
American conservation 




General assembly elects 
board of directors from 
members who are exclusively 
NGOs.
UTZ Certified Established in Guatemala 
City in 1999 and head 
office opened in the 
Netherlands in 2002. 
Market launch in 2002. 
Plantations, farmers, 
workers.
UTZ is governed by a 
supervisory board, with 
members from following 
groups: producers, supply-
chain actors, civil society, 
trade unions.  
BSCI Established in 2003 by the 
European Foreign Trade 
Association.
Companies, not open 
to farmers.
General assembly elects 
board of directors. 
Stakeholder council can 
advise on policy.
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Certificate History Target group Governance
Organic Established by various 
organic schemes in 1972 
as IFOAM. Currently 750 
member organisations. 
Companies, farmers. General Assembly elects 
world board that appoints 
working groups. National and 
supra-national  legislation 







Established in 1986 
(SAN) by eight (Latin) 
American conservation 




General assembly elects 
board of directors from 
members who are exclusively 
NGOs.
UTZ Certified Established in Guatemala 
City in 1999 and head 
office opened in the 
Netherlands in 2002. 
Market launch in 2002. 
Plantations, farmers, 
workers.
UTZ is governed by a 
supervisory board, with 
members from following 
groups: producers, supply-
chain actors, civil society, 
trade unions.  
BSCI Established in 2003 by the 
European Foreign Trade 
Association.
Companies, not open 
to farmers.
General assembly elects 
board of directors. 
Stakeholder council can 
advise on policy.
Audit model business model 
(values in Euros)
Price premiums Claimed producer 
benefits
Annual 3rd party 
Auditors need to be 
recognized by importing 
countries. IFOAM 
accredited auditors 
number 32. Audit paid 
for by certificate-holder.
Annual budget IFOAM 
1.9 million (2011). Fees 
(15%), earnings from 
projects and donors 
(66%), services (18%). 
Budgets of 750 member 
organisations not 
investigated, but likely 
substantial.
Price differential. -  Increase in yields
-  Improved livelihoods
-  Climate change 
resilience
-  Reduced financial r isk






is fully owned by 
Sustainable Agriculture 
Network, of which 
Rainforest Alliance is a 
founding member. Audits 
are paid by certificate-
holder.
Annual budget 
€ 35.3 million (2012). 
Government grants 
and contracts 




-  Increased on-farm 
efficiency 
-  Input reduction
-  Improved management
-  Cleaner, safer more 
dignified working 
place
-  Better access to 
specialty buyers
-  Contract stability
-  Favourable credit 
options
-  Publicity
-  Technical assistance
-  Premium markets
Annual, 3rd party audits 
by auditors accredited 
by UTZ Certified. Audits 
paid by certificate-
holder. 
Annual budget € 6.8 
million (2012). Income 
from subsidies (25%), 





-  Higher production or 
productivity
-  Better quality
-  Lower cost
-  Better income
-  Preservation of water, 
natural resources 
-  Protection of animals, 
plants and nature 
reserves
-  Reduction of pollution
-  Feeling healthy, 
motivated and 
respected
-  No child labour
-  Safe and healthy 
working environment
Initial 3rd party audit 
by a BSCI -approved 
auditor. Then every 3rd 
year. Audit fee paid by 
audited organisation.
No budget information 
found. Funds from 
membership fees.
No price premium. -  Improved workers’ 
r ights
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Certificate History Target group Governance
Ethical Trading 
Initiative
Founded in the 1990s. Companies and their 
suppliers.
Fair for Life Started in 2006 by 
Swiss Bio Foundation 
and IMO (which is a 




Privately held foundation 





Established in 2006 by 
consortium of businesses.
Companies. Suppliers 
such as farmers only if 
company require them 
to become compliant.
Executive board selected 
from members mandates 
working groups.
BSCI Established in 2003 by the 
European Foreign Trade 
Association.
Companies, not open 
to farmers.
General assembly elects 
board of directors. 
Stakeholder council can 
advise on policy.
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Certificate History Target group Governance
Ethical Trading 
Initiative
Founded in the 1990s. Companies and their 
suppliers.
Fair for Life Started in 2006 by 
Swiss Bio Foundation 
and IMO (which is a 




Privately held foundation 





Established in 2006 by 
consortium of businesses.
Companies. Suppliers 
such as farmers only if 
company require them 
to become compliant.
Executive board selected 
from members mandates 
working groups.
BSCI Established in 2003 by the 
European Foreign Trade 
Association.
Companies, not open 
to farmers.
General assembly elects 
board of directors. 
Stakeholder council can 
advise on policy.
Audit model business model 
(values in Euros)
Price premiums Claimed producer 
benefits
No audits for small-
scale farmers but 
needs assessment and 
development plans. 
Annual budget 
2.14 million (2012). 
Membership fees from 
companies (55%), 
donor funding (41%), 
services (4%).
No price premium 
to farmer.
-  Improve relations with 
buyers
-  Better handling of 
equipment and 
record keeping
-  Improve production
-  Better income
-  Better relation with 
employees
-  Reduced accidents
Audits every year. Audits 
done exclusively by 
IMO and paid for by 
certificate-holder.
No budget information 
found. 
Negotiable 
premium (5-10% of 
farm gate price).
-  Farmers receive a ‘fair 
share’
-  Improved livelihoods 
through community 
projects
-  Empowerment of 
people
-  Improved livelihoods 
through community 
projects
No audits, no certificate 
issued. Companies are 
responsible to ensure 
compliance of their 
suppliers.
No budget information 
found. Income from 
membership fees.
No premiums. -  Reduced audit 
burden by converging 
privately held supplier 
codes
Initial 3rd party audit 
by a BSCI -approved 
auditor. Then every 3rd 
year. Audit fee paid by 
audited organisation.
No budget information 
found. Funds from 
membership fees.
No price premium. -  Improved workers’ 
r ights
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Detailed information on studies used and cost 
information by commodity
In this appendix, information on the studies reviewed and used for analyses 
is presented for each commodity. In addition, detailed information on 
certification costs found from the literature can also be found.
Coffee
Number of coffee studies found and their methodology.




Type of study Nr of studies
Total studies found 110
With credible counter-factual 10
Partly credible counter-factual 4
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Upfront investment in Euro per farmer for coffee farmers to become certified. Costs paid by 
certificate-holder and costs paid by farmers are listed. Data are based on average upfront 
costs of UTZ, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic. n.a. means not available. No data were 
found on the costs of 4C. The row Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and 
may therefore not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Recurring cost in Euro per farmer per year to maintain certification by certificate-holder and 
farmer. Data are based on average recurrent costs of UTZ, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and 
Organic. n.a. means not available. No data were found on the costs of 4C. The row Total displays 
a range of total costs found in literature and may therefore not equal the sum of preceeding 
parts.
Table 11
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Registration fee, if any n.a. n.a.
Yield loss during conversion period n.a. n.a.





Staff training 0.40 n.a.
Producer training 9.41 n.a.
Management attention 3.80 n.a.
Total (range) 33.70 to 73.40 17.50
Table 12
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Operation of internal control system 8.80 n.a.
External audit n.a. n.a.
Materials n.a. n.a.
Infrastructure n.a. n.a.
Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training 10.49 n.a.
Other service delivery to producers n.a. n.a.
Premium payments 21.98 n.a.
Separating certified and non-
certified product flows at farm, 
in transit, during processing, 
warehousing and export
n.a. n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Total 43.59 to 77.69 18.26
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Cocoa
Types and number of cocoa studies found.
Number of information sources that contain data on implementation cost of cocoa certification, 
split by certificate (some sources contain information on more than one certificate).
Upfront investment in Euro per farmer to become certified for certificate-holders and farmers. 
Data are based on average upfront costs of UTZ certification. n.a. means not available. No data 
were found on the costs of Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic. The row Total displays a 
range of total costs found in literature and may therefore not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Table 13
Type of study Nr of studies
Total studies found 31
With credible counter-factual 1
Without credible counter-factual but impact related 5
Other 25
Table 14






Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Registration fee, if any n.a. n.a.
Yield loss during conversion period n.a. n.a.





Staff training 25.76 n.a.
Producer training n.a. n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Total (range) 25.76 to 106.74 80.78
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Recurring cost in Euro per farmer per year to maintain certification for certificate-holders and 
farmers. Data are based on average recurrent costs of  UTZ, Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade. 
n.a. means not available. No data were found on the costs of Organic certification. The row 
Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and may therefore not equal the sum of 
preceeding parts.
Cotton
Types and number of studies found.
Table 16
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer






Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training 19.94 n.a.
Other service delivery to producers n.a. n.a.
Premium payments n.a. n.a.
Separating certified and non-
certified product flows at farm, 
in transit, during processing, 
warehousing and export
4.66 n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Transport 3.07
Total 6.29 to 164.55 54.66
Table 17
Type of study Nr of studies
Total studies found 38
With credible counter-factual 1
Without credible counter-factual but impact related 10
Other 27
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Number of information sources that contain data on implementation cost of certification, split 
by certificate (some sources contain information on more than one certificate).
Recurring cost in Euro per farmer per year to maintain certification for certificate-holders and 
farmers. Data are based on average recurrent costs of Organic, BCI and CMiA certification. 
n.a. means not available. No data were found on the costs of Fairtrade certification. The row 
Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and may therefore not equal the sum of 
preceeding parts.
Table 18






Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Operation of internal control or management 
system
n.a. n.a.
External audits 30.3 n.a.
Materials n.a. n.a.
Infrastructure n.a. n.a.
Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training n.a. n.a.
Other service delivery to producers n.a. n.a.
Premium payments n.a. n.a.
Separating certified and non-certified product 
flows at farm, in transit, during processing, 
warehousing and export
n.a. n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Transport n.a. n.a.
Total 30.3 to 72.23 37.04 to 121.51
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Fruit and vegetables
Type and number of studies found on fruit.
Type and number of studies found on vegetables.
Number of information sources that contain data on implementation cost of fruit certification, 
split by certificate (some sources contain information on more than one certificate).
Table 20
Type of study (fruit certification) Nr of studies
Total studies found 41
With credible counter-factual 2
Without credible counter-factual but impact related 21
Other 18
Table 21
Type of study (vegetable certification) Nr of studies
Total studies found 25
With credible counter-factual 2
Without credible counter-factual but impact related 8
Other 15
Table 22
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Upfront investment in Euro per farmer to become certified by paying entity (fruit production). 
Data are based on average upfront costs of GLOBALG.A.P. certification. n.a. means not 
available. No data were found on the upfront costs of Organic, Rainforest Alliance and 
Fairtrade certification. The row Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and may 
therefore not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Recurring cost in Euro per farmer per year to maintain certification by paying entity (fruit 
production). Data are based on average recurrent costs of GLOBALG.A.P., Organic and 
Fairtrade certification. n.a. means not available. No data were found on the costs of Rainforest 
Alliance certification. The row Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and may 
therefore not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Table 23
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Registration fee, if any n.a. n.a.
Yield loss during conversion period n.a. n.a.
Set up internal control or management system 69.92 n.a.
Materials n.a. n.a.
Infrastructure 194.90 76.34
Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training 316.97 n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Total (range) 581.60 41.76 to 407.26
Table 24
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Operation of internal control or management 
system
64.37 451.67
External audits 77.21 1,012.07
Materials n.a. 12.39
Infrastructure n.a. n.a.
Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training 97.76 n.a.
Other service delivery to producers n.a. n.a.
Premium payments n.a. n.a.
Separating certified and non-certified product flows 
at farm, in transit, during processing, warehousing 
and export
n.a. n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Laboratory analyses 95.59
Transport n.a.
Total 103.73 to 561 0.61 to 2,604.69
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Number of information sources that contain data on implementation cost of vegetable 
certification, split by certificate (some sources contain information on more than one 
certificate).
Upfront investment in Euro per farmer to become certified by paying entity (vegetable 
production). Data are based on average upfront costs of especially GLOBALG.A.P. certification 
and one figure for total cost for Organic certification at certificate-holder level. n.a. means 
not available. No data were found on the upfront costs of Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade 
certification. The row Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and may therefore 
not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Table 25






Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Registration fee, if any 475.56 n.a.
Yield loss during conversion period n.a. n.a.
Set up internal control or management system 793.37 n.a.
External audit 1,475.06 n.a.
Materials n.a. n.a.
Infrastructure 3,850.62 n.a.
Staff training 848.89 n.a.
Producer training 263.62 n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Total (range) 15.31 to 7,707.13 312.84 to 703.62
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Recurring cost in Euro per farmer per year to maintain certification per paying entity (vegetable 
production). Data are based on average recurrent costs of GLOBALG.A.P. and Organic 
certification. n.a. means not available. No data were found on the costs of Rainforest Alliance 
and Fairtrade certification. The row Total displays a range of total costs found in literature and 
may therefore not equal the sum of preceeding parts.
Table 27
Cost item Certificate-holder Farmer
Registration fee 185.04 0.85
Operation of internal control or management 
system
n.a. 3.59
External audits 228.33 n.a.
Materials n.a. n.a.
Infrastructure 1,848.37 12.82
Staff training n.a. n.a.
Producer training 249.34 n.a.
Other service delivery to producers n.a. n.a.
Premium payments n.a. n.a.
Separating certified and non-certified product flows 
at farm, in transit, during processing, warehousing 
and export
n.a. n.a.
Management attention n.a. n.a.
Laboratory analyses n.a. n.a.
Transport n.a. n.a.
Total 9.19 to 2,511.10 16.36 to 221.39
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The complete list of 270 studies that were reviewed and categorised can be 
accessed here: http://edepot.wur.nl/310445
Appendix 4 
Categorisation of studies reviewed
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4. This grading system is loosely based on earlier work by Blackman and Rivera, 2011. The distinction 
is that we include costs of certification, which may originate from papers that are otherwise not 
in the top categories or even impact related.
5. Oxfam International, 2002. Mugged: Poverty in your cup. Oxfam
6. Authors’ graph, based on Ecolabels Index, a company selling descriptions of certification organisa-
tions. http://www.ecolabelindex.com/
7. Information on turnover of the organisations is derived from their annual reports and in the case of 
Rainforest Alliance from their 2012 Tax return (http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/sites/default/files/
about/annual_reports/IRS-990-2012.pdf). Turnover of Fairtrade is the sum of annual turnover of each 
national Fairtrade organization. The actual value for Fairtrade is higher than what is depicted here 
as not all financial data are reported by all Fairtrade organisations (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Japan, 
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